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1. Introduction 
When the third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991) reached its culmination 
point in the annus mirabilis of 1989 and the Cold War came to an end, the prospects of 
global democracy seemed brighter than ever before. Yet today, some forty years after 
the wave first emerged, much of the optimism initially conveyed by these developments 
has been replaced by growing scepticism as scholars and politicians alike have been 
forced to face a reality rife – not with liberal democracies – but with protracted transi-
tions, weak electoral democracies and, above all, a broad range of hybrid regimes, i.e. 
political regimes situated in a grey zone somewhere in-between the twin poles of autoc-
racy and democracy (Gagné 2010, 5). 
As the number of hybrid regimes has grown, so, too, has the literature endeavouring 
to identify the nature, strengths and weaknesses of these highly versatile regimes, rang-
ing from delegative democracy (O'Donnell 1994) and defective democracy (Merkel, 
Puhle, and Croissant 2003) to semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway 2003) and post-
totalitarianism (Linz and Stepan 1996). One of the most recent strings in this tradition 
has formed around a class of regimes christened electoral authoritarian regimes which 
are characterized by an intriguing contradiction: real electoral competition combined 
with a playing field so heavily and systematically skewed in favour of the incumbent 
that the regime nevertheless falls short of the procedural democratic minimum of free 
and fair elections (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 5; Schedler 2006, 3). 
Although the literature on electoral authoritarianism is still largely in its infancy 
(Miller 2009, 5), it has already yielded some noteworthy insights into the dynamics and 
consequences of this potentially uneasy wedlock between democratic and autocratic 
elements. Accordingly, multiparty elections seem to have an auspicious effect on de-
mocratisation, and may also be inversely related to regime stability, thus violating the 
very rationale for holding authoritarian elections – prolonging the longevity of dictato-
rial rule. More importantly still, these patterns appear to be contingent upon a fairly 
high degree of electoral competitiveness, as elections marked by a dominant autocrat 
and a weak opposition appear instead to be indicative of little more than continued non-
democratic rule (see Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Lindberg 2006; Roessler and Howard 
2009). 
This link between competitive authoritarian elections and regime outcomes is no triv-
ial finding, inasmuch as it contradicts many conventional wisdoms in the field of com-
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parative politics, such as the view of elite pacts constituting the prevailing mode of tran-
sitions to democracy (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986), or of hybrid regimes 
being inherently unstable systems (Huntington 1991, 137). Furthermore, this observa-
tion is also of more immediate practical importance since it could heavily influence the 
debate on democracy promotion and whether the “political approach” with its emphasis 
on elections is in fact the most efficient form of democracy assistance (Carothers 2009). 
Despite the substantial theoretical and practical significance electoral competitive-
ness holds for the study of authoritarian regimes, then, the literature on electoral au-
thoritarianism remains incomplete in a number of ways. For one thing, the field lacks 
conceptual and methodological rigour, with many studies exhibiting shortcomings that 
raise doubts about the robustness of their findings. More acutely, however, the existent 
theoretical corpus also reveals a pressing need for inquiries which – instead of taking 
the degree of electoral competitiveness as something externally given and concentrating 
on its consequences for a given regime’s continued existence – seek to “dissect” the 
phenomenon and turn it into a dependent variable in its own right. Put more succinctly, 
the current focus on the “output” dimension of competition at the expense of its “input” 
dimension has left our understanding of what causes the all-important variation in the 
degree of competitiveness in the first place piecemeal and contradictious at best. 
It is the contention of this thesis that much of the current confusion as concerns the 
“sources of competition” (Schedler 2009b) is not only, or even primarily, caused by 
difficulties in combining existent explanations, but by their overly constrained analyti-
cal scope. More specifically, the literature at large appears to be suffering from the 
omission of a very likely source of variation: by interpreting competitiveness as the out-
come of a strategic game of power between the ruling dictator and the opposition, 
scholars have failed to fully appreciate the fact that authoritarian elections invariably 
involve a third player – the voters – whose preferences and behaviours are likely to in-
fluence the strategies of the two main actors, and thereby the degree of competitiveness. 
The decision of most scholars to simply ignore the electorate or to treat it as a homo-
geneous monolith without a will of its own is problematic as it not only implies – ironi-
cally enough – that the way in which the voters choose to cast their ballots is trivial for 
the outcome of the election; it also blatantly disregards what appear to be significant and 
systematic differences in how voters with heterogeneous socio-demographic back-
grounds choose their preferred candidate in the institutional setting of electoral autoc-
racy. In consequence, the potential of the electorate to influence the electoral fortunes of 
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the dictator and the opposition by virtue of its particular socio-demographic composi-
tion remains virtually unexplored. 
This lacuna in the literature forms the point of departure for this thesis as it sets out 
to probe the existence of a causal relationship between the degree of electoral competi-
tiveness and voter heterogeneity across the universe of national-level elections held in 
electoral autocracies during the period 1974–2006. Although the focal point of the study 
consists of an investigation into the reasons that explain the voters’ decision to either 
support or oppose continued dictatorial rule in line with Beatriz Magaloni’s (2008) the-
ory of voter behaviour and regime survival, the thesis concurrently also strives to ad-
dress some of the other shortcomings in the literature by employing new data as well as 
more rigorous conceptualisations and methods, while also taking tentative steps towards 
bridging some of the existent theoretical strings. 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two serves as an introduction to the by 
now quite substantial body of literature dealing with electoral authoritarianism and 
seeks to elucidate the logic of studying electoral competition in autocratic regimes. To 
this purpose, it first provides definitions of the central concepts used in the study before 
elaborating upon the link between the degree of competitiveness and regime stability, 
which provides the underlying motivation for the investigation at hand. The chapter 
then proceeds to evaluate competing theories of the determinants of competitiveness, 
and ends by developing an argument of why the voters as a collective of more or less 
heterogeneous actors ought to be taken into account in a more systematic manner, on 
the basis of which the actual research question is finally stated. 
Chapter three is dedicated to Magaloni’s (2008) theory of voter behaviour, which 
provides the theoretical underpinnings for the quantitative analysis carried out later in 
the thesis. This section first spells out the gist of Magaloni’s argument, from which it 
then derives hypotheses that aim at probing the impact of voter heterogeneity on elec-
toral competitiveness. The section closes with a discussion of the potential limitations of 
the theory when employed in a broader, more global context. 
Chapter four is divided into two sections. The first one elucidates the choice of data 
as well as the operationalisation of the variables in preparation for the actual analysis. 
The latter section explores the method to be used in the study – a random effects regres-
sion analysis – and presents the regression models. Throughout the chapter, an effort is 
also made to consider some of the shortcomings that earlier studies display on the 
methodological front. 
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Chapter five presents the results from the regression analysis and reflects upon these 
in the light of Magaloni’s (2008) theory. Finally, chapter six wraps up the study with a 
summary and considers the wider implications of its findings. 
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2. Electoral competitiveness in authoritarian regimes 
The rulers of electoral autocracies stand before a formidable challenge. Unlike their 
colleagues in politically closed autocracies, they have adopted the language of democ-
racy by establishing elections as the only lawful route to power, by introducing univer-
sal suffrage and by allowing rivalling parties to aspire to the highest national level of-
fices at regular intervals. But because the institutionalisation of multiparty competition 
by necessity infuses the electoral process with a degree of uncertainty regarding its out-
come, the autocrats suddenly find themselves faced with the new and very real threat of 
an opposition victory at the polls. Consequently, their remaining in power becomes de-
pendent upon a skilfully performed balancing act between evoking genuine popular 
support and limiting de facto competitiveness under conditions of de jure unlimited 
competition through all means possible (Schedler 2009c, 293–294). 
The attempt at reconciling the most fundamentally democratic trappings of all with 
substantially authoritarian outcomes is often doomed to failure as is demonstrated by 
the 2002 elections in Kenya, where the pro-democracy opposition parties were after two 
close runs finally able to bring down the long-standing regime of the Kenya National 
African Union (KANU). Yet, sometimes the endeavour to curb competitiveness without 
effectively suffocating it turns out to be a success, and a stable, albeit somewhat coun-
terintuitive equilibrium emerges as the autocratic rulers go on winning overwhelmingly 
in spite of political alternatives existing, something the Singaporean People’s Action 
Party (PAP) has continued to do since the inauguration of the country’s self-government 
in 1959. 
It is this dilemma of electoral competition, crystallised in the converse regime trajec-
tories of Kenya and Singapore, that is to form the overarching theme of this thesis. See-
ing that non-democratic elections produce very dissimilar regime outcomes depending 
on their level of competitiveness, how can this divergence in the margins of victory 
across the universe of structurally competitive authoritarian elections be accounted for? 
Why is competitiveness successfully bridled and domesticated in some electoral autoc-
racies, while it turns into an unpredictable and counterproductive element in others?  
Before any attempt at narrowing down this problem to a form more conducive to 
empirical testing can be made, however, we need to deepen our understanding of its 
nature. Consequently, it is the purpose of this chapter to paint a “broader picture” of the 
literature dealing with electoral competitiveness in autocratic regimes by first presenting 
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the conceptual foundation of the field, then moving on to explore the empirical and 
theoretical ties that link the level of competitiveness to processes of authoritarian stabil-
ity and breakdown before surveying the plethora of explanations that seek to shed light 
on this variation. The chapter ends by formulating the actual research question on the 
basis of a discussion of the caveats these earlier efforts display. 
2.1. The conceptual building blocks – defining the object of study 
A logical first step in the endeavour to gain insight into what causes the degree of com-
petitiveness to vary in structurally competitive authoritarian elections is to locate the 
phenomenon of interest within the broader conceptual framework of electoral authori-
tarian regimes that is to structure the consequent analysis. 
The study of political regimes has long constituted one of the central fields of politi-
cal science. Understood as institutionalised rules and procedures of a formal or informal 
nature that determine access to political power and to the making of publicly binding 
decisions (Geddes 1999, 16; Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76), scholars have since antiquity 
mapped the topography of regimes in varied typologies with the goal of explaining how 
different systems encourage certain types of behaviour among political actors, leading 
in consequence to diverging political outcomes and policies. In spite of this rich history, 
however, contemporary political science has largely come to operate within a dichot-
omy encompassing two opposite systems of governance. In the spirit of Hans Kelsen’s 
(1925) distinction between autonomous and heteronomous norms, the basic regime 
types now consist of democracy, which is characterised by laws that are binding for the 
legislators and the addressees alike, and autocracy, where the lawgivers are exempted 
from adhering to the norms they draw up (Gandhi 2008a, 3–7; Merkel 2010a, 21–22).1 
Although the analytical limelight in this thesis falls on the latter of these categories, 
we are, in the absence of a positive definition of autocracy, compelled to first specify 
democracy as a politological concept in order to grasp the characteristics of its negation 
– a task which, in stark contrast to the ease with which an etymological definition of 
democracy as “rule by the people” can be derived from the corresponding Greek nouns 
                                                   
1
 Kelsen draws on the logic of Machiavelli, who was the first to sort political regimes into two categories 
on the basis of who the rulers were – rule by the one or by the assembly – thus departing from the older 
Aristotelian tradition of a regime-triad consisting of monarchy (rule by the one), aristocracy (rule by the 
few) and democracy (rule by the many) (Gandhi 2008a, 7). 
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demos (δήμος) and kratein (κρατείν), belongs to the most perennial ones in all of politi-
cal science (Dahl 1989, 14). The fierce debate on how to flesh out the abstract principle 
of the people’s sovereignty has principally been confined to the realm of democratic 
theory, though, as the empirical branch of comparative politics habitually compromises 
on a minimalist and procedural view of political democracy for purposes of analytical 
clarity (Collier and Adcock 1999, 540). This notion delimits democracy exclusively to 
the political sphere and strips it of all traits that are “not indispensable for its identifica-
tion” (Sartori 1976, 61), while heeding the institutional base of the regime as opposed to 
its substantial outcomes. By thus avoiding many of the perils that arise from using more 
maximalist and substantive concepts, the procedural minimum lends itself well to em-
pirical inquiries. These perils include problems in establishing causality between an 
outcome of interest and a regime type in the presence of multiple defining dimensions; 
tainting the concept with tautologies and normative concerns; and the preclusion of 
theoretically interesting questions about the relationship between a system of govern-
ance and a given attribute, caused by the latter being incorporated into the definition of 
the former (Bernhagen 2009, 26; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, 72–74; Gandhi 
2008a, 8–9; Hadenius and Teorell 2004, 6–8; Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 7–14). 
In line with these premises, the core-principle of democracy materialises in the shape 
of contested elections as is most plainly seen in Schumpeter’s classic characterisation of 
democracy as a method for choosing the political decision-makers through “a competi-
tive struggle for the peoples’ vote” (Schumpeter 1994, 269). However, this definition 
has been accused of excessive minimalism (e.g. Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 
2001, 41–45), on account of which Dahl’s (1971) more demanding concept of polyar-
chy or real type democracy has with some variations enjoyed considerable popularity in 
the field (see Krennerich 2002). Here, the dimension of contestation is supplemented 
with two additional attributes: universal participation and institutional guarantees in the 
form of political rights and civil liberties, which are to lend the elections democratic 
meaning (Berg-Schlosser 2004, 52; Dahl 1971, 1–9; Müller and Pickel 2007, 524). 
Despite the general predilection for the Dahlian notion of democracy, this thesis con-
tinues in the Schumpeterian tradition and identifies contested elections that serve to ful-
fil governmental offices as the watershed separating democracy from autocracy (Alva-
rez et al. 1996, 4; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, 69). This definition entails 
firstly that both the chief executive and the effective legislative body be elected, but for 
a given regime to truly qualify as “a system in which parties lose elections” (Przeworski 
12 
 
1991, 10), the electoral battle further needs to meet three criteria, namely ex-ante uncer-
tainty as regards its outcome so that no actor can dictate the results beforehand; ex-post 
irreversibility, indicating that the winners of the election de facto ascend to power; and 
repeatability, meaning that the political mandate of the elected government is pro tem-
pore only (Alvarez et al. 1996, 4–7; Przeworski et al. 2000, 15–18). 
Why opt for the more parsimonious definition encompassing only contestation? 
Apart from its firm rooting in democracy theory, two further justifications bear men-
tioning. On the one hand, it can be argued that the dimension of participation has lost 
much of its original analytical saliency since the 1970s as universal suffrage has become 
the rule (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 2001, 43; Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 
11). On the other, by including political rights and civil liberties in the definition of de-
mocracy, polyarchy ceases to be a strictly procedural definition inasmuch as the purpose 
of these rights is clearly to warrant a substantive outcome of the political process, viz. 
the political equity of voters (Dahl 1971, 2–3, 1989; Saward 1994, 13–14). This fur-
thermore precludes any empirical investigation into the relationship between these 
rights and a given type of regime (Przeworski et al. 2000, 33–34). If we therefore follow 
the pragmatic advice of Collier and Adcock (1999), who urge us to adapt our concepts 
to the respective empirical dilemma we are seeking to illuminate instead of constructing 
concepts based on generic notions, usage of the purely electoral criteria of Przeworski et 
al. can be vindicated by their allowing for more flexibility in dealing with these rights as 
a variable in the empirical analysis that is to follow.
2
 
As a consequence of this deliberation, we are now in a position to define autocracy 
as a system of governance in which the ruler – also termed autocrat or dictator – has 
attained power by means other than contested elections (Gandhi 2008a, 7). But just as 
the category “democracy” can, in order to distinguish between countries like the Philip-
pines and Sweden, be divided further into electoral democracy and liberal democracy, 
where the former signifies the presence of the basic democratic institutions and the lat-
ter mirrors how these actually work in view of such qualitative democratic ideals as 
freedom, accountability and rule of law (Hadenius and Teorell 2004, 8–10), so, too, has 
                                                   
2
 Such generic notions seem to underlie Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán’s harsh criticism of Alvarez 
et al.‘s (1996) “subminimal definition”, which by excluding civil liberties fails to reflect democracy “as 
that word is understood in the modern world” (Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán 2001, 40–41). 
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autocracy been analytically fine-tuned with the help of subtypes that it may better cap-
ture the many nuances of non-democratic rule. 
The most classical disaggregation is arguably that by Juan Linz, who distinguishes 
between authoritarianism and totalitarianism on the basis of three dimensions.3 Linz 
interprets the former as a system that allows limited political pluralism, draws legiti-
macy from distinct mentalities such as nationalism, and lacks popular mobilisation, 
whereas he regards the latter to be characterised by a monistic society and an all-
encompassing ideology combined with intensive and extensive mobilisation efforts 
(Linz 1975, 2000).
4.
But while this set of criteria and the seven-fold typology of authori-
tarian regimes it laid the foundation for speak of Linz’s deep empirical knowledge of 
non-democratic regimes, its utility is reduced considerably by analytical inconsistencies 
and idiosyncrasies that originate from the lack of systematic criteria on which to base 
the dimensions and to identify graduations within these (Brooker 2000, 22–29; Gandhi 
2008a, 8; Merkel 2010a, 41–42). Not surprisingly, the old demarcation between authori-
tarianism and totalitarianism is increasingly being abandoned in more recent taxono-
mies, which display a much reduced degree of complexity in their approach to classify 
non-democratic regimes singly based on their modus of power maintenance (e.g. Gan-
dhi 2008a; Geddes 1999). In keeping with these newer typological developments, “au-
thoritarianism” is in the remainder of this thesis used interchangeably with “autocracy” 
and “non-democracy”. 
It is in this newer tradition that we may pigeonhole the typology of electoral authori-
tarianism as originally devised by Levitsky and Way (2002), Diamond (2002) and 
Schedler (2002a, 2002b). This taxonomy categorises political regimes according to the 
nature of their national-level popular elections that serve as the route to power, and 
crystallises in this fashion three different types of systems as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
On the right-hand side of the spectrum, one detects electoral and liberal democracies, 
which both feature contested elections and are therefore grouped together despite their 
differences with regard to the deepening of democracy. When crossing over to the non-
                                                   
3
 Initially, a fourth dimension was included, namely the exercise of power, which in authoritarian regimes 
took place within limits that are “formally ill-defined […] but actually quite predictable”, as compared to 
the omnipotent claim to power of the totalitarian fuehrer or party (Linz 1970, 255). 
4
 Totalitarianism was originally considered to constitute a sui generis regime type beside democracy and 
has been the subject of intense theorisation (e.g. Arendt 2004, Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965). However, 
because the number of empirical cases to which the concept could reasonably be attached has steadily 
dwindled in the course of the twentieth century, totalitarianism is now typically subsumed under the lar-
ger analytical category of autocracy as a subtype alongside authoritarianism (Brooker 2000, chapter 1). 
14 
 
 
   
democratic side, one in turn finds at the left-hand extreme a heterogeneous group of 
non-competitive regimes termed politically closed autocracies. These systems either 
dispense with elections altogether in favour of allocating power through, for instance, 
military orders or royal lineage as is the practice in Saudi-Arabia, or like Cuba, organise 
single-party elections in which opposition parties are not allowed to run (Howard and 
Roessler 2006, 366–367).5 
Figure 2.1. Disaggregation of political regimes using electoral criteria 
Closed autocracy Electoral authoritarianism Democracy 
Non-
electoral 
autocracy 
Single-party 
autocracy 
Hegemonic 
autocracy 
Competitive 
autocracy 
Electoral and 
liberal democracy 
No  
elections 
Non- 
competitive 
elections 
Low 
competitiveness 
High 
competitiveness 
Contested  
elections 
Source: Schedler (2009c); Howard and Roessler (2006). 
Finally, in the middle of the spectrum one encounters the category electoral authori-
tarianism, which on closer inspection turns out to be made out of a certain kind of hy-
brid regimes – a term which, in its broadest sense, denotes systems that mix democratic 
features with authoritarian ones, but which are still sufficiently stable so as not to qual-
ify as transitional, falling hence somewhere in a grey zone between the twin ideal re-
gime types (Gagné 2010, 7; Krennerich 2002, 59–60). As the term “electoral authori-
tarianism” implies, however, hybrids are seldom treated as a regime type sui generis 
(but see Lauth 2002; Morlino 2009; Rüb 2002); instead, they are attached to the estab-
lished dichotomy with the help of adjectives as diminished subtypes, viz. as incomplete 
instances of either the democratic or autocratic root concept (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 
437–438).6 What hides behind this particular label is a compilation of regimes which 
                                                   
5
 This approach has been criticised by Snyder (2006) and Hadenius and Teorell (2007) on the grounds 
that especially the category of politically closed regimes masks important qualitative differences between 
autocratic regimes, for example, as concerns the degree of stateness by lumping together cases as dis-
tinctly different as Somalia and North Korea. 
6
 The popularity of this strategy has mainly found expression in an unfortunate inflation of “adjectivised” 
ad hoc regime types that seek to describe the missing feature of an otherwise democratic or authoritarian 
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use a nominally democratic institution – multiparty elections with universal franchise – 
to serve the acquirement of power at the national level, but at the same time subvert the 
electoral process so systematically and severely in favour of the incumbent autocrat that 
they cannot be considered democratic (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 5–6; Schedler 2006, 
5).
7
 This indicates that while elections in electoral autocracies fall short of contestation 
as the dictator can use illicit means not open to democratic rulers to secure his victory, 
by allowing multiple parties to run they nonetheless differ from single-party elections 
by enabling competition and competitiveness, the latter of which can be used to divide 
electoral authoritarianism further into the subtypes of hegemonic and competitive au-
thoritarian regimes.8 
The typology of electoral autocracy in other words aims at identifying authoritarian 
regimes that organise competitive elections and thus enable competitiveness. But what 
exactly does this mean? If we follow Hyde and Marinov (2010) and Strom (1989), who 
expand on the seminal work of Giovanni Sartori (1976), competition and competitive-
ness can be understood as two interlinked dimensions of the electoral struggle between 
political parties for votes and office. In its original wording, competition is defined as 
the structural prerequisite for such a struggle – in less cryptic terms, it can be thought of 
as the rules of the game that engender the possibility of a competitor entering the politi-
cal market and winning over the voters (ibid., 217–221; see also Strom 1989, 278–279). 
However, since Sartori’s original definition conflates competition with contestation and 
thus renders it a defining feature of democracy, this thesis employs the concept as modi-
fied by Hyde and Marinov to also encompass non-democratic polities by disregarding 
the notion that for us to be able to speak of competition, the elections must constitute a 
                                                                                                                                                     
system without relating it to a larger taxonomy (Bogaards 2009, 400–401; Collier and Levitsky 1997, 
450–451). In laying the foundation for a novel regime typology, the literature on electoral authoritarian-
ism is in other words somewhat exceptional, although not entirely unique – for an example of a typology 
of diminished subtypes operating with a democratic root concept, see the literature on defective democra-
cies (Merkel et al. 2003; Merkel 2004), and for an interesting proposition of a double-root strategy com-
bining these two hybrid typologies Bogaards (2009). 
7
 Especially Levitsky and Way (2002, 54–57) have argued that the concept of electoral authoritarianism 
be expanded to also encompass other institutions such as the legislative and the judiciary. Nevertheless, 
even their analysis is delimited to the principal arena of contestation, i.e. the elections (see also Schedler 
2009a, 387, 2010a, 71–76). 
8
 The threshold separating hegemonic regimes from competitive ones is often operationalised as the in-
cumbent winning at least 65–75 per cent of the vote (Diamond 2002; Roessler and Howard 2008) or an 
absolute majority in parliament (Greene 2010; Reuter and Gandhi 2011). However, seeing that this prac-
tice violates the logic of regime classification – fluctuating electoral outcomes are no indicator of changes 
having occurred in the institutional features that define the system – I utilise these subcategories not as 
analytical entities in the strict sense, but rather as hermeneutic tools for structuring the argument. 
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free and fair battle between equals.9 In this vein, competition is considered to exist 
when the electoral rules allow for opposition, there is more than one party and the vot-
ers have a choice between at least two candidates on the ballot, regardless of how unfair 
the contest, how distorted the principle of electoral uncertainty, and how unlikely the 
event of a challenger running and triumphing may otherwise be (Hyde and Marinov 
2010, 6). 
In keeping with the economic analogy, competition as a structure accordingly signal-
ises the existence of a political market with the potential of bringing about an alterna-
tion in power. Yet, this alone tells us nothing about how well the market really operates 
and whether the competitors succeed in actualising the potential of competition. For 
this, a second behavioural dimension is clearly called for, and competitiveness can thus 
be defined as a function of the influence which the contestants – with or without foul 
play – exert on the choices of voters and thereby on the election results. Competitive-
ness in other words emerges as the measurable outcome of interparty competition, and 
may in this capacity vary between two extremes. On the one hand, there is the “low-
competitiveness” of hegemonic regimes, where the ruling party gains an overwhelming 
victory or even runs unopposed, and, on the other, the “high-competitiveness” of com-
petitive authoritarian regimes with a nearly even distribution of strength and thin mar-
gins that leave the incumbent autocrat only a hairsbreadth away from defeat, or even 
force him to step down should the opposition challenger succeed in overtaking him 
(Hyde and Marinov 2010, 6–7; Sartori 1976, 217–221; Strom 1989, 278–279). 
With this, we begin to have an overview of the theoretical territory that is to be cov-
ered in the thesis and, equipped with this conceptual roadmap, may now move on to 
investigate our beast in its natural habitat. 
2.2. The empirical background – competitiveness and regime outcomes 
“Typologies are instrumental in the research process: they are 'functional' in the sense 
that they have been constructed to be useful in the research process.” Although this ob-
servation was made by McKinney (1969, 3, emphasis in the original) more than forty 
years ago, it has lost nothing of its validity, and one may hence safely presuppose that 
                                                   
9
 Interestingly enough, Hyde and Marinov fail to explicitly mention that they undertake such a drastic 
alteration of Sartori’s concept (see Hyde and Marinov 2010, 6–7). 
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the taxonomy on electoral authoritarianism with its focus on competitiveness has been 
devised in order to facilitate the analysis of some empirical phenomenon. Before seek-
ing to shed light on the factors that account for variance in the degree of competitive-
ness, one might thus stop and ask why fluctuations in the margins of victory are of im-
portance for the study of authoritarian regimes in the first place. 
In the light of the previous sections, it requires little skill to deduce that electoral 
competitiveness gains salience in the context of autocracy because it reveals something 
about the likelihood of an alternation in power occurring. To use a more exact terminol-
ogy, it reveals something about the stability of an electoral authoritarian regime as well 
as about its propensity to democratise: if the ruling autocrat wins by a comfortable mar-
gin, his rule can be considered consolidated, but if he loses due to heightened competi-
tiveness and subsequently steps down, the criteria of contestation as stated earlier are 
fulfilled and the regime is considered to have undergone a transition to democracy. This 
link to regime outcomes suggests, then, that the investigation into the essence, workings 
and consequences of competitiveness under autocratic rule is logically a part of the 
broader field of democratisation studies, which explores the sources of regime stability 
and instability. Yet, it only constitutes one of its most recent branches; indeed, studies 
of competitiveness were to remain scarce and sporadic well into the 1990s. 
The fact that political scientists proved sluggish in making the connection between 
competitiveness and regime outcomes may appear confounding when viewed against 
the backdrop of the empirical and academic developments that the so-called third wave 
of democratisation (Huntington 1991) gave rise to with its global surge in regime transi-
tions from autocracy to democracy, unleashed by the Portuguese Carnation Revolution 
of 1974 (Lindberg 2009b, 7–8).10 On the one hand, the wave was from the very begin-
ning accompanied by a slow but steady increase in the number of competitive authori-
tarian elections, as shown by Figure 2.2. On the other, the wave gave birth to a strong 
                                                   
10
 A wave of democratisation is defined by Huntington (1991, 15–16) as “a group of transitions from non-
democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly out-
number transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time”. He goes on to identify three 
waves of democratisation – the first (1828–1926), the second (1943–1962) and the third (1974–) – and 
two reverse waves – the first (1922–1942) and the second (1958–1975) – “in which some but not all of 
the countries that had previously made the transition to democracy revert[…] to nondemocratic rule” 
(ibid.). The third wave is considered to have been the largest and most global in scope: between 1987 and 
2006 alone, the amount of electoral democracies (operationalised as regimes scoring < 2 on the Freedom 
House or ≥ 6 on the Polity IV index) grew from 25 to 62, which translates into a whopping increase of 
almost 150 per cent (Roessler and Howard 2009, 112). 
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phase of theoretical expansion in the literature on authoritarian regimes, as the acceler-
ating diffusion of democracy across large parts of Southern Europe, Latin America and 
Asia in the course of the 1970s and 1980s engendered a heightened need to illuminate 
the mechanisms driving regime breakdown and democratisation (Lindberg 2009b, 7–8). 
Figure 2.2. Authoritarian elections, 1960-2005 
 
Source: Hyde and Marinov (2010); Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010); calculations by the author. 
That competitiveness did not rise to the analytical forefront as a consequence of these 
processes can be accounted for by three factors. Firstly, one can discern a general disin-
terest in authoritarian elections caused by the paradoxical inclination of electoral studies 
to view non-democratic elections as something of an oxymoron for failing to perform 
the same tasks as their democratic counterparts. As a consequence, authoritarian elec-
tions were dismissed as meaningless “window-dressing” (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 
1292), i.e. as the effort of dictators to erect a democratic façade for purposes of regime 
legitimation (Gandhi 2008a, xix–xx; Hermet 1978, 1–10). 
Secondly, in spite of the already mentioned incremental increase in the number of 
electoral autocracies, overlooking this variation in authoritarian elections is likely to 
have been facilitated by the relative scarcity of competitive elections on the autocratic 
side of the regime divide (Diamond 2002, 23–24). Authoritarian elections are of course 
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rulers were holding less-than-democratic elections already in the eighteenth century, 
with national-level elections having been a nearby ubiquitous feature of authoritarian 
regimes since at least the 1970s (Hermet,  ose, and  ouquié 1978, vii–viii; Schedler 
2010a, 69).
11
 Furthermore, amongst these highly diverse electoral battles – organised 
with varying regularity at different levels of government, under different rules and for 
different offices with varying powers – one recurrently finds both competitive specimen 
as well as instances which are better described as unequivocally non-competitive exer-
cises in outlawing, imprisoning and annihilating the opposition (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 
2009, 404; Schedler 2009c, 293). Notwithstanding the fact, then, that contemporary 
electoral autocracies have progenitors in systems such as Mexico under the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) and Senegal under the Senegalese Socialist Party (PSS), the 
forty-five years of oscillation in the global number of national-level authoritarian elec-
tions allowing for interparty competition as compared to non-competitive elections, 
depicted in Figure 2.2, show the former group to have constituted a minority throughout 
most of the covered period, with a steep increase having occurred only after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989.
12
 
Thirdly and lastly, electoral competition did not fit the research agenda that quickly 
came to dominate the expanding field of regime studies. As such, the idea that authori-
tarian elections might stimulate and affect the course of regime breakdowns and democ-
ratisation was not entirely alien to the literature, as some earlier contributions had al-
ready explored this possibility with regard to the first two waves of democratisation (see 
Dahl 1971; Rustow 1970). With the growth of “transitology” in the 1970s, this earlier 
tradition in fact made some scholars come alive to the role of elections in regime transi-
tions. Most notably, the edited volume of Hermet, Rose and Rouquié (1978) featured 
pioneering studies that persuasively argued the effects of “elections without choice” on 
autocratic stability and instability to be contingent upon their degree of competitiveness 
as a mirror of the underlying balance of power between political actors. 
Yet, their notion of electoral competition as the engine of these processes met with 
little sympathy in the broader field. The fact of the matter is that, with the seminal defi-
                                                   
11
 In the year 2008, for example, only six of the world’s 172 independent states with a population over 
500,000 did not organise direct national-level elections. These six countries include China, Eritrea, Libya, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia (Hyde and Marinov 2009, 1). 
12
 If expressed numerically, this means that while some 8.6 competitive elections were organised annually 
between 1980 and 1989, the global average roughly doubled to 17.5 between 1990 and 1999 (Hyde and 
Marinov 2010; Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010; calculations by the author). 
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nition of a regime transition as introduced by O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 
(1986) and as employed by Przeworski (1991, 1992), the causal weight in transition 
studies increasingly fell on the strategic pacting of divided government and opposition 
elites. Originally denoting a movement from authoritarianism, whose outcome was seen 
to be contingent upon the existent constellation of actors, a transition was now under-
stood as a movement toward democracy in which the rulers’ decision to open up the 
regime politically unleashed a “slippery slope” (Brownlee 2009a, 131) that led in a 
quasi-mechanical fashion first to the establishment, and then to the consolidation of 
democracy. In this analysis, which saw in non-democratic elections nothing but a sign 
of an ongoing liberalisation, electoral competition was helplessly left to play second 
fiddle (ibid., 130–132; Carothers 2002, 7–8; see also Lindberg 2009b, 2–3; Merkel 
2010a, 66–67).13 
In sum, the bulk of the literature traditionally either ignored electoral competition in 
autocracies or construed it as an index of political instability, causing hybrid regimes 
displaying this feature to be classified as inherently volatile systems pending democrati-
sation. Yet, this “transition paradigm” (Carothers 2002) began to appear progressively 
dubious in the course of the 1990s. As the number of autocracies holding competitive 
elections skyrocketed in connection with the third wave peaking in the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, this set in motion two developments that ultimately forced scholars to 
rethink the role of elections and competitiveness in authoritarian regimes. 
Firstly, while some of these newly materialised electoral hybrids did live up to exis-
tent theories by crossing over the regime divide to become democracies, this seemed 
suddenly to occur through qualitatively unprecedented transitions. Contrary to estab-
lished scholarly wisdom, political negotiations and previous regime types appeared ir-
relevant here as growing numbers of autocrats were forced to relinquish power in the 
wake of a series of gradually more competitive elections that ended in an opposition 
victory. Secondly, scholars were beginning to realise that to treat electoral hybrids as 
“democracies with adjectives” (Collier and Levitsky 1997) moving slowly toward popu-
lar rule by virtue of their competitive elections, might constitute nothing short of an 
                                                   
13
 Although the methodological pluralism of the transition literature increased in the 1990s to also include 
system and structuralist theories, taking into account, amongst other things, such factors as the level of 
modernisation (Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003), class-structures (Rueschemeyer, Huber 
Stephens and Stephens 1992), and previous regimes types (Linz and Stepan 1996), these developments 
did not raise elections to the forefront of the analysis (Lindberg 2009b, 2; see also Merkel 2010a, 67–89). 
21 
 
“electoral fallacy” (Karl 1986, 1995), as many of these systems turned out to be defying 
established theories in an even more fundamental way by stubbornly refusing transition. 
Instead, they seemed to induce the third wave to begin showing signs of ebbing by 
evolving into stable “autocracies with adjectives” in which the elections continued to 
translate into sustained non-democratic rule as the impotent opposition watched the 
autocrat go on winning with impressive vote-margins (Brownlee 2009a, 130–131; Dia-
mond 2002, 23–24; Lindberg 2009b, 2; McFaul 2002).14 
In the guise of these transitions and the distension of the grey zone between democ-
racy and autocracy that saw the proportion of non-democratic regimes organising multi-
party elections rise from some 30 per cent to over 70 per cent between 1990 and 2000 
(Reuter and Gandhi 2011, 88), scholars were presented with circumstantial evidence 
suggesting that electoral competition might have a more active role to play in processes 
of regime perpetuation and breakdown than previously thought.
15
 By the turn of the 
millennium, a growing number of studies accordingly began to hypothesise about a rela-
tionship between regime outcomes and the degree of electoral competitiveness that 
eventually laid the foundation for the literature on electoral authoritarianism. 
This association has since become the central object of study within this field, with 
the majority of studies now attesting to the utility of distinguishing between the auto-
cratic regimes of the third wave on the basis of electoral criteria. The thesis of elections 
as “a new mode of transition” (Lindberg 2009b) is thus supported, for example, by the 
cross-national quantitative inquiries of Miller (2010b), Hadenius and Teorell (2007), as 
well as Howard and Roessler (2006; Roessler and Howard 2009), who all find a positive 
association between democratisation and competitive authoritarian regimes, as opposed 
to hegemonic and closed authoritarian regimes. Howard and Roessler additionally dis-
cover that a high level of competitiveness not merely increases the likelihood of further 
liberalisation and democratisation, but also facilitates regime breakdown, which Bunce 
and Wolchik’s (2009) analysis of Eastern Europe seconds. 
Moreover, scholars are beginning to understand the causal mechanisms that lurk be-
hind these correlations. As Miller summarises (2010a, 4–6), competitive elections may 
                                                   
14
 It remains disputed whether or not this movement indicates a change of tide and the beginning of the 
predicted authoritarian reverse wave (compare e.g. Diamond 2008; Merkel 2010b). 
15
 Of these multiparty autocracies measured using data by Przeworski et al. (2000), the proportion of 
hegemonic regimes (when the criterion is an absolute majority in the legislative) equals some 60 per cent 
(Reuter and Gandhi 2011, 88). 
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work toward these ends through the actual outcome of political competition itself 
(Tucker 2007); by helping actors to overcome collective action problems, as witnessed 
in many electoral revolutions (Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Lindberg 2009a; Schedler 
2002b, 2010b); and by spreading a democratic culture, thus raising electoral standards 
over time (Bunce and Wolchik 2006, 9; Lindberg 2006, 2009a). 
Turning to the problem of explaining “authoritarianism in an age of democratization” 
(Brownlee 2007), several large-N studies show elections to be much more than merely 
compatible with authoritarian rule – they in fact actively prolong the longevity of non-
democratic regimes (Geddes 2006; Roessler and Howard 2009; Schedler 2009c, 297–
299, see also Geddes 1999). Nevertheless, the level of competitiveness appears again to 
make all the difference: as far as endurance goes, hegemonic authoritarian regimes lose 
to their non-competitive single-party cousins but have the upper hand over their more 
competitive counterparts (Cox 2009; Schedler 2009c, 297–299); a point seconded by a 
set of qualitative case studies on Mexico (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2008), Egypt (Blay-
des 2008; Koehler 2008) and Jordan (Lust-Okar 2006, 2009b). 
The “regime subverting” and “regime sustaining” (Schedler 2009c, 291) powers of 
competitive authoritarian elections have, however, also been subject to scepticism. 
Thus, Brownlee (2009a, 2009b) finds no such effects, although competitive authoritar-
ian regimes in his analyses seem to harbour a heightened probability of being succeeded 
by a democratic regime. In their study of Latin America, McCoy and Hartlyn (2009) 
uncover a more mixed picture, with elections sometimes contributing to democratisation 
processes and sometimes not. Furthermore, although this discrepancy in the findings 
may still at least partly be passed off as a function of the respective authors’ diverging 
choices regarding conceptualisation and operationalisation, there is some concern that 
the findings of some contributions might in fact be compromised on a more fundamen-
tal methodological level by a flawed universe of cases (Bogaards 2007, see also chapter 
four in this thesis). Simultaneously, especially the theorem of competition as contribut-
ing to democratisation – and not just regime breakdown – has on theoretical grounds 
been found to be vulnerable to charges of endogeneity, seeing that it is very difficult to 
warrant for causality and its direction in the context of general liberalisation and democ-
ratisation. In a word, we cannot exclude the possibility that “elections may characterize 
democratization without necessarily causing it” (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 415–416). 
While the matter of the relationship between electoral competition and regime out-
comes is subsequently far from settled, the bulk of the research nevertheless speaks 
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clearly for the significance of the degree of competitiveness as an indicator of regime 
stability and breakdown – albeit maybe not of democratisation – and the challenge now 
becomes to explain this divergence. To this we turn in the following. 
2.3. The theoretical debate – explaining the logic of electoral competition 
When attempting to account for variation in the degree of competitiveness, the very 
nature of the dependent variable suggests employing a framework that derives its ex-
planatory power from developments at the micro-level of analysis. Not surprisingly, 
then, the mode of analysis par préférence in studying the logic of competitive authoritar-
ian elections has been rational choice theory-oriented new institutionalism (Lindberg 
2009a, 317–318). The gist of this approach is to focus on outcomes as the product of a 
strategic interaction between instrumentally rational and utility-maximising actors 
within a given institutional setting. Institutions gain momentum insofar as they can be 
utilised to mould the strategic game through which the self-reflecting actors pursue their 
interests. Institutions thus not only constitute the game and its players, but also constrain 
the behaviour of the latter by creating selective incentives and punishments that condi-
tion their choices, capabilities and beliefs. In this vein, institutional structures over time 
reduce uncertainty in complex and impersonal social situations by giving birth to self-
sustaining conventions of political interaction that contribute to the maintenance of cer-
tain equilibria (Carey 2000, 738; Lindberg 2009a, 317–318; North 1990, 3–6). 
From this, it logically follows that the way in which elections are structured carries 
momentous implications for how and why actors play the electoral game. Contested 
elections, for instance, are intended to provide a universally accepted and respected 
regulatory framework for gaining temporary control over the state and its policies, and 
feed peaceful interparty competition by inducing political groupings to fight for votes, 
but to also accept defeat and turn into parliamentary opposition (Levitsky and Way 
2010a, 29).
16
 Non-competitive elections, in contrast, are designed to quench political 
competition over power and to enforce the status quo. In this instance, elections emerge 
as an alternative to repression and terror in making up for the autocrat’s lack of democ-
ratic legitimacy – they in other words help the dictator to overcome the two perennial 
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 Here, parties are thought to play the electoral game in order to maximise their vote-shares because only 
an electoral victory unlocks the many advantages of holding office. This idea, put forth forcefully by 
Downs (1965), is not universally accepted, though (see e.g. Strom 1990; Harmel and Janda 1994). 
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problems of all self-appointed rulers, namely that of soliciting compliance on the part of 
the elites and the population so as not to risk a palace coup or a rebellion, and that of 
encouraging their cooperation in order to generate the funds necessary for maintaining 
his structures of power through taxes, savings and labour.
17
 Elections serve this purpose 
by offering a mechanism for channelling the conflicting interests of the dictator’s peers 
and subjects into a contest over access to government spoils and graft rather than into 
one over access to state power, enabling the autocrat thus to create vested interests in 
the survival of the regime (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Darden 2008; Gandhi 2008a, 
xvii–xviii; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Schedler 2009d, 4–5; Wintrobe 2007, 366).18 
Figure 2.3. The actor-constellation of competitive authoritarian elections 
Autocrat Elites 
 
Government 
  
Opposition Voters 
The institutional blueprint of electoral authoritarian regimes unites these two struc-
tures by positing elections as being constitutive of a game that grants the actors depicted 
in Figure 2.3 – the (de jure) elected government, the opposition, and the voters – legiti-
mate roles in the process of exchanging state power competitively for votes, and as 
serving the interests of the autocrat as a tailor-made tool for warranting regime per-
petuation.
19
 By doing so, it traps the actors in an institutional limbo that lends competi-
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 Again, although dictators are driven by a number of different ambitions (see Wintrobe 2007, 363–364), 
it is assumed that the first and foremost objective of any autocrat (and of his challengers) is to hold office, 
since this is a precondition for attaining any variety of other goals (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 7). 
18
 While it is now widely believed that the rationale for holding authoritarian elections is the perpetuation 
of the dictator’s tenure, it does not follow that elections are originally instituted with this particular pur-
pose in mind. In fact, an attempt to unravel the reason for holding non-democratic elections by “reading 
backwards” from their current functions approaches functionalism, as Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009, 407) 
rightfully point out in their article. It appears more fruitful to instead assume that, although elections may 
be instituted for various reasons, they all tend to generate very similar political dynamics and outcomes in 
the long run due to the similar institutional constraints they put in place (ibid.). 
19
 The introduction of multiparty competition rests uneasily with the notion of elections as tool for regime 
reproduction and cannot yet fully be explained by comparativists. While some scholars offer a general 
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tive authoritarian elections their characteristic nature as two-level games, that is, as two 
interdependent strategic battles between the incumbent and the opposition, firstly over 
votes, and secondly over the institutional rules of the game (Schedler 2006, 12, 2009b, 
180; see also Tsebelis 1990). This ambivalence is capable of stimulating very different 
political dynamics, causing some electoral autocracies ultimately to emerge out of this 
cross-fire of enabling and constraining institutional impetuses as hegemonic, while oth-
ers evolve into the competitive subtype. 
2.3.1. The equilibrium of hegemonic authoritarianism 
For an autocrat who enters competitive elections with the goal of maintaining his power 
and thwarting the efforts of the opposition to topple the current system in favour of a 
new democratic or autocratic order, the “Open sesame!” that unlocks the door to the 
benefits of elections is an overwhelming victory at the polls. But how can such a low 
level of competitiveness be achieved and maintained? The answer lies, to paraphrase 
Beatriz Magaloni’s (2008, 16) extension of an argument by Barbara Geddes (1999), in 
the dictator succeeding in establishing a behavioural equilibrium, where both the elites 
and masses find it to be in their interest to support the regime, and the opposition is do-
mesticated to play along without questioning the rules of the game. The autocrat usually 
has plentiful opportunities to strike such a balance by virtue of his incumbent advan-
tage, endowed by his relatively discretionary control over the twin apparatuses of state 
and coercion (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 407), which scholars view as being instru-
mental to three broad, and to some extent substitutive strategies, namely co-optation, 
repression, and institutional manipulation.20 
Co-optation using politicised public resources is often marked down as the single 
most important tactic to affect the level of competitiveness (Greene 2010, 808). Here, 
elections are instrumental in that they help the dictator, first, to identify his strongholds 
among the electorate, and, second, to institutionalise political business circles (Blaydes 
                                                                                                                                                     
explanation to this paradox by referring to the functionalist requirements of individual rulers (Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2009; Miller 2009), the recent proliferation of such elections is usually explicated with his-
torically contingent factors, viz. the strongly pro-democratic political climate of the post-Cold War era 
that rendered closed authoritarianism more costly and induced dictators to establish pseudo-democratic 
institutions for legitimation purposes (Schedler 2009c, 298–299; Levitsky and Way 2010, 16–19). 
20
 It is worth noting that many of these strategies are also employed in democracies, the difference being, 
however, that they in the case of electoral authoritarian regimes serve to distort the game so severely that 
a turnover in power is nearly unforeseeable (Pepinsky 2007, 142). 
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2006a; Pepinsky 2007) through which government spoils and patronage are distributed 
as jobs, land and public services to loyal minions, while they are withdrawn from defec-
tors as punishment for their having dared to cast a ballot in favour of an opposition can-
didate (Greene 2010, 812; Lust-Okar 2006; Roessler and Howard 2008, 13). Corre-
spondingly, elections may aid the dictator to reinforce his government by providing 
crucial information on which of the notables count as powerful enough to necessitate 
co-opting (Boix and Svolik 2007, 3–4; Malesky and Schuler 2010). In contrast to ap-
pointments, elections also contribute to the solving of intra-elite commitment problems 
by offering the notables a fair and regularised mechanism for gaining a share of the 
spoils and promotions on the basis of one’s electoral performance (Blaydes 2008; 
Langston 2002). Elections are thus a prime instrument for the dictator to not only lower 
the costs of patronage, but to also obviate what in empirical light must be considered his 
most serious peril, viz. an intra-elite split (Geddes 1999, 2006; O'Donnell, Schmitter, 
and Whitehead 1986). Moreover, vote buying and pork barrel politics deprive the oppo-
sition of voters and potential candidates in the form of defectors, but typically also di-
vest the challengers of independent sources of finance by expanding the public sector at 
the expense of the more independent private sector, which, as demonstrated by the So-
cial Democratic Front in Cameroon and the Semangat ’46 in Malaysia , often proves 
fatal to opposition parties (Greene 2010, 812; Levitsky and Way 2010a, 62; Lust-Okar 
2009b, 23; Roessler and Howard 2008, 13).
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While comparativists have long emphasised the second alternative, repression, as a 
frequently employed tool for societal and political control (see Arendt 2004; Friedrich 
and Brzezinski 1965), younger contributions tend to acknowledge that raising the costs 
of supporting the opposition by means of unlawful incarcerations, extrajudicial killings 
and other violations of civil rights is prone to have unintended and counterproductive 
consequences (see Wintrobe 2007), which might explain why state-organised violence 
seems to constitute something of a last resource in hegemonic systems. This is not to 
say that hegemonic regimes are a “tea party” (Castañeda quoted in Magaloni 2008, 10) 
– the threat of repression is certainly omnipresent, but the overall use of coercion is in 
the presence of well-working co-optation mechanisms likely to remain relatively spo-
                                                   
21
 In this, the literature on electoral authoritarianism goes against the basic assumptions of classical coali-
tion theory, which holds minimally winning coalitions to be the most rational tactic in distributive zero-
sum games (see Riker 1962). 
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radic and targeted by nature, as the regime can rely on spoils by way of buttressing its 
political dominance (Greene 2010, 812; Levitsky and Way 2010b, 61; Magaloni 2008, 
10–11; Roessler and Howard 2008, 11–12). 
Lastly, dictators can pick and choose from their variegated “menu of manipulation” 
(Schedler 2002a) in order to tamper with the balance of power before, during, and after 
the elections. Being normally highly idiosyncratic and ad hoc-type of measures 
(Roessler and Howard 2008, 14), an attempt at summarizing the vast literature tracking 
this rich panoply of strategies must be renounced in favour of some stylised facts. Nev-
ertheless, many of these manipulative measures take the shape of institutional engineer-
ing, where particular rules concerning ballot access, vote thresholds and state subsidies 
are altered to the disadvantage of the opposition. This may entail an introduction of ar-
bitrary rules directed at hindering the coalescence of opponent forces by banning indi-
vidual parties and candidates, as illustrated by the fate of opposition candidate Alassane 
Ouattara, who in 1994 was disqualified from running in Cote d’Ivoire on the grounds of 
his parents having been born abroad (ibid.; Schedler 2002a, 42). 
Alternatively, dictators may change the type of electoral system being used, with ma-
joritarian systems often thought to benefit the regime candidates more than proportional 
representation by creating incentives for coalescence among the elites – a common 
stratagem in Egyptian legislative elections during the Mubarak era (Norris 2009; Posus-
ney 2002, 44; but see Magaloni 2008, 235) – or take to gerrymandering as in Jordan, 
where redistricting plays a significant role in perpetuating the political underrepresenta-
tion of the Palestinian minority (Lust-Okar 2009b, 23–25). In addition, the incumbent 
government may bias news flows in support of its candidates, while simultaneously 
limiting the public visibility of its opponents (Roessler and Howard 2008, 11; Schedler 
2002a, 43–44). In this, state-owned media empires are obviously the most apt tools, but 
as the case of Malaysia under the rule of the Barisan Nasional demonstrates, even pri-
vately owned media outlets can be made to perform this task with the help of corruption 
and other illicit means (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 11). 
Last but not least, dictators are frequently involved in more clandestine affairs classi-
fied as electoral fraud. As scholars have invented ingenious ways in which to study this 
covert but ubiquitous phenomenon, the picture that is emerging of forged voters’ IDs, 
stuffed ballot boxes and falsified results on election day is that vote fabrication tends to 
shape the electoral outcome to a much lesser degree than one might be tempted to think, 
with fraud being decisive only in close elections (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 413; Le-
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houcq 2003, 252; Lust-Okar 2009b, 21). That hegemonic regimes subsequently do not 
appear to rest upon ballot rigging may again be explained by co-optation being the pre-
ferred modus operandi, seeing how fraud – if and when detected – is capable of eroding 
the credibility of the electoral institution and spurring electoral protests, rendering the 
potential costs it may inflict much higher than those arising from the maintenance of 
patronage relations (Lehoucq 2003, 249; Pepinsky 2007, 141–142). 
The three broad strategies delineated here obviously hold no guarantee of victory, for 
even if the dictator is in control of ample funds, guns and newspapers, the effect of these 
measures still depends upon the obedience and dexterity of his operative subordinates 
(Schedler 2009b, 182–183; Way 2005, 2006). But to the extent that they do serve their 
purpose, these mechanisms enable the dictator to forge a unified government that bene-
fits from “genuine” popular support by enticing voters and elites to espouse economic 
thinking in the literal sense of the word (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 408–410). 
How, then, does this affect the behaviour of the opposition, the other key actor of the 
elections? Thinking back to the structure of electoral competition under autocracy as a 
two-level game, challengers in hegemonic systems clearly face an uphill battle at the 
game level of elections that is difficult to win by engaging electoral campaigns. They 
still have two strategies at their disposal at the meta-level of institutional change, 
though: to either boycott the elections or to mobilise the voters to protest against the 
autocrat’s handling of the elections (Schedler 2006, 14). Both require a fairly high de-
gree of opposition coordination and party-internal cohesion to work, however, which is 
difficult to achieve in the light of ideological differences between parties and the strate-
gic dilemmas these stratagems entail (see van de Walle 2002): in the case of a boycott, 
an opposition party may hinder the elections from gaining legitimacy in the eyes of do-
mestic voters and international election observers (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009), but must 
usually pay a very high prise in foregoing the material benefits of the “loyal opposition” 
with legislative representation (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 411). In the case of a mass 
protest, the challengers may in turn stand to gain liberalising concessions from the re-
gime (Schedler 2009b, 186), but cannot exclude the possibility of an authoritarian 
crackdown upon the protesters (Magaloni 2010). 
Under these circumstances, the expected gain of participation may well outweigh 
that of non-participation. As especially the dependency upon the regime for resources is 
prone to split the opposition ranks by creating incentives to free-riding, the dominant 
strategy indeed often becomes acquiescence, as some adopt a coalitional strategy and 
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align with the regime at the risk of losing their political credibility among the voters, 
whereas more ideologically bent opponents form small niche parties (Schedler 2008). In 
the end, the old tactic of divide et impera hence carries the day with the dictator being 
able to contain institutionalised electoral uncertainty and freeze the level of competi-
tiveness to his advantage (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 411–412; Levitsky and Way 
2010a, 29–32; Posusney 2002, 48–49; Roessler and Howard 2008, 15–16; Schedler 
2009b, 189–192). 
2.3.2. The disequilibrium of competitive authoritarianism 
Seeing that the opposition is so severely disadvantaged by the autocrat’s “hyper-
incumbency advantages” (Greene 2007, 2) that the very notion of resistance seems to 
turn futile, one cannot reasonably expect the degree of competitiveness to fluctuate 
much unless the equilibrium of hegemony is broken and the opposition can use the elec-
tions as a focal point for coalescence against the dictator. Because equilibria are by 
definition conjunctures of a game “that once entered into will not be departed from 
unless some exogenous conditions change” (Przeworski 1992, 106), scholars have as-
cribed a paramount role to external factors in explaining how the electoral playing field 
comes to be levelled after the foundation upon which the low level of competitiveness 
rests begins to erode, causing the polity ultimately to evolve into a competitive authori-
tarian regime. 
An impetus for change is often provided by the economy. Just as economic growth 
translates into support and resources for the regime, the dictator is rendered vulnerable 
in times of slow growth rates and economic downturn – as the economy deteriorates so, 
too, does his level of support amongst the voters (Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 255–256, 
2010, 49; Roessler and Howard 2008, 18–19), although hegemonic regimes must on 
average be considered rather robust to economic crises (Smith 2005). Nevertheless, in 
particular the elites seem to identify in economic crises a propitious moment for defec-
tion as the promise of spoils and promotions fades away, at the same time as the weak 
economy provides challengers with an issue to mobilise voters around. A well-known 
example of this is the decision taken by the Corriente Democrático faction under the 
lead of Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas to split from the ruling PRI party in the midst of the 1988 
IMF crisis in Mexico and join an oppositional coalition shortly before the presidential 
elections (Reuter and Gandhi 2011, 85). Alternatively, the resource monopoly of the 
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regime may collapse as distributing patronage on a national scale turns too expensive in 
the long run, with the system beginning to malfunction as the fiscal health of the regime 
deteriorates (Roessler and Howard 2008, 13), or hegemonic rule is given the deathblow 
in the shape of extensive privatisation which, as Greene (2010) notes, gnaws away the 
public sector and enables the opposition to build up financial sources of its own. 
As the efficacy of co-optation begins to crumble, autocrats seek to cushion the ef-
fects by taking increasingly to repression and manipulation (Schedler 2009b, 183). 
However, this substitution has in the post-Cold War era often only served to highlight 
the Janus-faced nature of electoral competition under autocracy. In an international po-
litical climate where liberal democracy has become the standard, manipulation and co-
ercion easily spill over to outcry and condemnation beyond the immediate boarders of 
the country, which might play into the hands of the opposition at the game-level of elec-
tions. The clearest instances of this are autocracies with a heavy dependency upon inter-
national aid, such as is the case in much of sub-Saharan Africa. As aid is generally con-
ditional upon making progress in liberalisation and democratisation, authoritarian rulers 
across the region are placed between a rock and a hard place in having to either risk 
losing these funds if they are caught rigging the ballot, or risk losing office if they re-
frain from fiddling with electoral integrity (Cox 2009, 4; Lust-Okar 2009b, 28–32; 
Roessler and Howard 2008, 13). This strategic dilemma turns all the more acute by to-
day’s almost omnipresent international election observers, who indeed seem to deserve 
some credit in ridding elections of the most blatant forms of fraud (Hyde 2007). 
Apart from utilising their diplomatic leverage directly, international actors may exert 
influence over the electoral game indirectly through linkage, that is, through a country’s 
economic, social and communicational ties to democratically ruled polities that can be 
used to alter the cost-benefit calculations of domestic actors. Internationally networked 
elites and voters can hereby gain incentives and resources to demand more liberalisation 
and fairer elections, but it can also benefit the opposition in the form of international 
legitimacy, assets, as well as important know-how from civil society and opposition 
groups abroad (Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Levitsky and Way 2005, 2010a, 339). 
Even in the absence of a strong international input, an increased reliance on coercion 
or forged ballots involves potentially high costs for weakened autocrats since the altered 
parameters of the game grant the opposition more room to manoeuvre and a chance to 
tip the electoral scales in its favour as voters and elites become more volatile. In this 
context, opposition protests in the hope of institutional reforms can gain new saliency 
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(Schedler 2010b). Bunce and Wolchik (2009, 258–260) remark that increasing the level 
of repression at a time of crisis may smack of desperation and kindle resistance by sig-
nalising a possibility for political change. Fraud seems to have similar effects, for the 
suspect of “stolen elections” heightens the likelihood of remonstration even in the ab-
sence of international observers (compare Beaulieu and Hyde 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 
2009, 264). Under these circumstances, opposition boycotts and mass protests can help 
to convert the voters, elites and – crucially – the armed forces to the belief of a turnover 
in power being possible, thus contributing to a kind of “self-fulfilling expectation” 
(Lindberg 2009a, 335–336) that is likely to translate into a greater vote-share for the 
opposition in the electoral arena (Gandhi and Przeworski 2009, 31–33). 
Also the game-level strategies of the oppositional forces can make a difference to the 
electoral outcome. Competitiveness is known to gain a boost if opposition parties are 
capable of overcoming their internal commitment and collective action problems (see 
Gandhi 2008b) by creating a bloc against the common enemy in his hour of weakness, 
with the chances of this happening increasing as the regime begins to look weak and the 
material gains of collaborating with it fade away. Coalescence then becomes key to mo-
bilising the elites and especially the voters in support of the opposition, as a broad op-
position coalition is perceived to have better chances of bringing down the dictator and 
of governing once he has been removed (Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 262–263, 2010, 51; 
Howard and Roessler 2006, 371; Lindberg 2009a, 363; van de Walle 2002). In sum, 
elections may deliver the opposition new opportunities of winning over divided elites 
and volatile voters, elevating it to a much improved position from which to launch an 
offence against the regime in the electoral arena once a first crack in the autocrat’s edi-
fice of electoral dominance has appeared. 
2.4. The limits of existent explanations – the contribution of this thesis 
The aim of the account above was to present in summarised form the impressive pro-
gress that scholars have done in identifying the strategies employed by the electoral 
contenders when trying to woo the voters, as well as in explaining how these tactics 
engender dynamics in the political market that eventually transform a hegemonic sys-
tem into a competitive one (or vice versa, should the reader be more inclined to the 
teachings of Machiavelli). 
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Where does all this leave us with regard to explaining divergence in the degree of 
competitiveness in structurally competitive authoritarian elections, then? Despite stu-
dents of electoral authoritarianism having reached a consensus on many points, it never-
theless seems that the literature in its current state still has some way to go as far as the 
task of producing a more comprehensive understanding of electoral competitiveness in 
autocracies is concerned. Although scholars now agree on co-optation, coercion, and 
manipulation, on the one hand, and opposition boycotts, protests and coalitions on the 
other, alongside a set of exogenous factors to make up the building-blocks of competi-
tiveness, even state-of-the-art contributions give us little in the way of a blueprint on 
how to forge these components into a coherent theoretical argument of the determinants 
of competitiveness under non-democratic rule. 
While immediately disregarding the naïve idea of some grand theory aspiring for 
universal explanatory power and acknowledging that there is a considerable need for 
further theoretical as well as methodological advances in the nascent field, the crux of 
the matter is that, as the literature continues to grow, the important insights produced 
hitherto increasingly lack coordination, with scholars taking little interest in seeking to 
unite at least some of the already identified mechanisms in a more systematic manner. 
Indeed, most contributions persist in utilising the fairly limited theoretical and empirical 
scope of the pioneering generation of studies, with the investigators contenting them-
selves with exploring the workings of one single mechanism while ignoring other fac-
tors, this being endemic in much of Schedler’s work (e.g. 2008; 2009b); delimiting the 
argument to only encompass one specific regime-subtype or time period as Greene 
(2010) and Roessler and Howard (2008) do; or, even when operating with a plurality of 
mechanisms, treating these as rivalling explanations to be successively eliminated in the 
course of the analysis, such as is the method of Bunce and Wolchik (2010). 
Though such research designs are not without their merits, this practice is – when 
taken together with the variation originating from scholars’ methodological choices – in 
the long run paramount to rendering our view of the phenomenon piecemeal and blur-
ring the empirical picture. Should we for instance follow Schedler (2009b), who claims 
the level of competitiveness to be primarily dependent upon the government’s control 
over the media, on the one hand, and opposition boycotts and protests, on the other? Or 
Greene (2010), who finds a big public sector to be the overriding explanatory variable? 
Or are these domestic factors in fact of only secondary importance when compared to 
regime-external causes as Levitsky and Way (2010a) would have us believe? 
33 
 
Echoing Munck (2001, 131) who with regard to the state of theory building in the 
field of democracy studies remarks how “[its] various insights do not quite add up to a 
clear statement of a general theory. Instead, they are only bits of theory that are un-
clearly related to one another”, whereas its empirical testing is lacking insofar as this 
has been carried out “on only a small set of cases or on only a small set of explanatory 
variables raising doubts about the generalizability and/or the validity of causal claims” 
(ibid., 122), the literature on electoral authoritarianism still amounts to but a shadow of 
a thick and general theory. Yet, while the challenge of theoretical parochialism – whose 
existence is generally acknowledged in the field (see Miller 2009, 5–6) – continues to 
be an impediment to our efforts of piecing together the jigsaw-puzzle that is competi-
tiveness, I suspect that this endeavour may be undermined by an additional problem that 
has received much less attention in the field so far. The question is in fact whether we 
are in possession of all the pieces necessary for assembling this puzzle in the first place. 
Indeed, there is some concern that the literature on electoral authoritarianism has up 
till now largely overlooked two interlinked and potentially important factors in the 
study of competitiveness. The first of these pertains to the old “agency-structure prob-
lem” (Mahoney and Snyder 1999, 4) and centres on the lack of attention paid to the 
broader societal structures in which the electoral game is embedded. This apprehension 
stems from an observation originally made by Dahl, who in his highly influential book 
“Polyarchy” (1971) noted how the path to polyarchy had traditionally run through com-
petitive oligarchies, which had little by little turned increasingly inclusive. Paralleling 
one of the most important democratisation theories, modernisation theory (see Boix and 
Stokes 2003; Deutsch 1961; Lipset 1983; Przeworski et al. 2000), Dahl went on to con-
sider demographic plurality together with the level of socioeconomic development to be 
among the driving forces behind this transformation process, with rising levels of de-
velopment increasing the demand for competitive politics. 
Even though the path itself, as Dahl acknowledged, had ceased to be of importance 
by the time of the third wave of democratisation since the overwhelming majority of 
non-democratic regimes had already turned broadly inclusive, this pattern hints at the 
possibility that societal structures may well affect electoral competitiveness under au-
thoritarian rule. As Miller points out (2009, 6), structures as – to use the apt phrase of 
Merkel (2010a, 88–89) – a “corridor of action” that constrains the key actors and limits 
their room for manoeuvre are, however, seldom taken into account with regard to mar-
gins of victory. While structures are sometimes employed in a modernisation theoretical 
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sense as an alternative explanation to democratisation in studies probing the relationship 
between the degree of competitiveness and regime stability (see Brownlee 2009b; 
Bunce and Wolchik 2010), inquiries into the relationship between structures and com-
petitiveness remain scarce and procure us with a mixed picture. While Greene (2010) 
discovers development when measured as GDP per capita to have the expected effect on 
the electoral balance between the incumbent and the opposition, the study of Roessler 
and Howard (2008) finds no trace of such a relationship, although the methodological 
soundness of the latter study is somewhat doubtful (see chapter 4.1.1). 
Structures are also closely related to the second and far more imperative concern, 
which pertains to the nearby complete exclusion of another very likely source of varia-
tion that appears all the more bizarre when one considers the nature of the topic under 
investigation. The fact of the matter is that although competitiveness is conceived as the 
aggregate outcome of how the voters choose to cast their ballots, the electorate as a po-
litical actor is – as a perceptive reader no doubt has already noticed – more often than 
not conspicuous by its absence in the literature on electoral authoritarianism. 
How can this staggering paradox be accounted for? Perusing the literature, it would 
seem that even if the choices of the electorate are recognised to have a major impact on 
the cost-benefit calculus of the two principal actors and thereby on the outcome of the 
electoral game (e.g. Lindberg 2009a, 326), many a scholar finds the task of identifying 
the preferences that guide the behaviour of the voters in non-democratic regimes to be 
herculean for dictators, opposition candidates and political scientists alike on account of 
the distorting effect exerted by the levels of manipulation and repression these systems 
entail (e.g. Schedler 2009b, 188). Most theories on competitiveness hence refrain from 
modelling voter behaviour altogether and instead simply take the relationship between 
the autocrat and the opposition to be of a zero-sum nature, with the electorate’s favour 
being transferred automatically from the one to the other as the parameters of the game 
change (Bunce and Wolchik 2010, 62). 
But to discard the masses merely on the grounds that it is challenging to incorporate 
them into the argument is not only simplistic; it leads the scholar to assume that the 
electorate is a monolith, whose actions are in essence nothing more than reactions. And 
there are good reasons to believe that this assumption is unwarranted in both its sub-
components. Regarding the latter part, just consider the simple examples of co-optation, 
which is generally believed successful as long as the incumbent has unrestrained access 
to resources, and economic downturns, which are thought to provoke dissatisfied voters 
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to defect en masse to the opposition. Yet as the phenomenon of oppositional niche par-
ties testifies to, not all voters give into co-optation even when the dictator has a fat 
piggy-bank to draw on (Greene 2007, 2); an economic recession not always marks the 
end of the dictator’s electoral support (Magaloni 2008, 263); and once voters do defect 
for whatever reason, this does not necessarily happen to the benefit of the opposition 
(Bunce and Wolchik 2010, 61–62). 
All this suggests that the voters indeed have a will – or, better still, wills of their own, 
as also the assumption of the electorate constituting a monolithic actor seems unjustifi-
able if viewed in the light of a handful of newish case studies, in which Magaloni 
(2008), Blaydes (2006b), Lust-Okar (2006, 2009a, 2009b) and others have taken impor-
tant first steps in mapping the terra incognita of voter behaviour in competitive authori-
tarian elections.
22
 Although the insights of these studies are drawn from a small pool of 
countries (viz. Mexico, Egypt and Jordan) and caution is thus called for when making 
generalisations, the picture to emerge out of these endeavours is surprisingly coherent, 
and indicates that although the behaviour of the voting public in electoral autocracies 
often differs starkly from that in democratic polities due to the idiosyncratic institutional 
constraints put in place by this form of non-democratic rule, it follows a strikingly simi-
lar logic. Ecological factors (e.g. Aistrup 2004; Dawson and Robinson 1963; Koetzle 
1998) and social cleavages (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan 1967) as traditional predictors of 
voter behaviour thus seem to retain their validity even in autocracies as the preferences 
that guide the citizens’ actions appear to stem from their backgrounds and identities in 
terms of ethnicity, wealth and occupation. If one in keeping with the basic tenet of ra-
tional choice theory takes the voters to be rational, utility-maximising actors in pursuit 
of their interests, the observed patterns of how, for example, poor and rural voters tend 
to be regime-loyal, whereas their richer and urban compatriots tend to favour democ-
racy suggest that voter behaviour in electoral autocracies varies systematically with the 
demographic and socio-economic composition of the electorate. 
This train of thought logically leads to two interesting propositions. First, by ena-
bling and constraining the choices of the government and opposition elites, the voters 
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 There is some older literature on voting behaviour in countries which the criteria used in this thesis 
would identify as electoral autocracies, this being the case especially with Mexico (see e.g. Domínguez 
and McCann 1995). Yet, operating outside the framework of electoral authoritarianism, these studies take 
into account the non-democratic nature of the institutional structures in which the electoral game is em-
bedded to a varying degree – if at all – and the applicability of these insights is thus somewhat limited. 
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are clearly among the forces that help to strike a balance of power between these two 
actors at the polls, thereby directly affecting the degree of competitiveness. Subse-
quently, the voters constitute an indispensible part of the political equation of electoral 
autocracy and deserve a far more prominent role in theories of competitiveness than 
existing approaches are willing to permit. Second, the voters’ influence on the margins 
of victory is clearly more complex than the literature at large has acknowledged. As the 
preferences guiding the voters’ choices in this process reflect their various identities, 
which in turn mirror the socio-demographic underpinnings of society, the “voter effect” 
ought to be understood in terms of the consequences that different forms of voter het-
erogeneity, i.e. the particular composition of the electorate, have on voting behaviour 
and competitiveness. Because this necessitates “bringing the structures back in”, a focus 
on the voters also serves to bridge the current gap between agency and structure. 
In this light, the hypothesised relationship between the degree of competitiveness and 
the electorate emerges as simply too important and intriguing a topic to be ignored any 
further. Confident that opening up this black box will contribute to the literature on 
electoral authoritarianism by exploring a potentially important source of variation, the 
research question to which this thesis seeks an answer can be stated as follows: 
What is the effect of voter heterogeneity on the degree of competitiveness in structur-
ally competitive authoritarian elections? 
In addition to this, a secondary goal can be set. Seeing how earlier contributions have 
tended to operate within a framework that is plainly constrained in theoretical, geo-
graphical and temporal terms, the study at hand also aims at testing the robustness and 
generalisability of their findings in a broader empirical context. The subsequent analysis 
will thus not only encompass all theoretically relevant elections during the third wave of 
democratisation, but will also take into account alternative explanations as discussed 
earlier so as to evaluate their explanatory worth relative to one another and the voters. 
Before either goal can be tackled, though, we need to develop an understanding of 
how different types of voters cast their ballots. The electorate must also be juxtaposed 
with the other actors in the larger analytical framework so as to derive testable hypothe-
ses pertaining to the main point of interest. Consequently, the next chapter is devoted to 
the one contribution that enables me to do precisely this, namely Beatriz Magaloni’s 
(2008) theory that seeks to explain the stability of electoral authoritarian rule through 
the lens of electoral competition and the voting behaviour of a heterogeneous electorate. 
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3. A theory of electoral competitiveness and voter heterogeneity 
This chapter lays the theoretical foundation that will undergird the consequent empirical 
analysis probing the impact of a socio-demographically heterogeneous electorate on the 
margin of victory in electoral autocracies. With this goal in mind, the following sections 
survey the theory of Beatriz Magaloni (2008) as presented in her widely acclaimed book 
“Voting for autocracy. Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico”. 
Magaloni’s contribution to the literature on electoral authoritarianism aims in all brevity 
at elucidating the mechanisms through which a hegemonic-party regime, on the one 
hand, retains its permanence and, on the other, loses its electoral dominance and democ-
ratises. Both of these processes are modelled as a decision-theoretic game involving 
four actors – the autocrat, the elites, the opposition and the voters – with my being pri-
marily interested in the electorate. 
As will become clear presently, the theory provides a particularly well-suited frame-
work for the inquiry at hand because it focuses explicitly on the voters, but in doing so 
also takes into account the strategies of the other actors, which enables me to address 
the previously discussed issue of “theoretical parochialism”. Another reason for choos-
ing this theory is that, although the argument is largely based on the case of Mexico, it 
is designed to be “broadly comparative” (ibid., 30), and should on Magaloni’s own ad-
mission also be applicable to cases that are more commonly classified as competitive 
authoritarian regimes (ibid., 37). Nevertheless, the theory has to the best of my knowl-
edge not been empirically applied to other cases so far, which means that my study with 
its global scope offers a prime opportunity for putting the generalisability of Magaloni’s 
thesis to the test. While the bulk of the chapter hence focuses on reproducing 
Magaloni’s argument and deriving hypotheses from it, the section ends on a more criti-
cal note with a discussion of the potential pitfalls that may arise when using what is es-
sentially a middle-range theory in a global, cross-national analysis. 
3.1. Introduction – the autocrat and the structure of the electoral game 
In seeking to explain the “mechanics of the survival and demise” (Magaloni 2008, 4) of 
hegemonic rule, Magaloni’s theory of authoritarian electoral politics, whose most im-
portant insights are illustrated in Figure 3.1, takes as its point of departure the by now 
familiar argument of elections being instituted for the purpose of resolving the two fun-
damental dilemmas common to all non-democratic rulers, i.e. how to ensure the compli-
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ance and the cooperation of their peers and subjects. In the case of competitive elec-
tions, this requires the autocrat to win at the polls, which is achieved by luring the elites 
and the masses to support the regime, and by forcing the opposition to invest in the exis-
tent institutions in lieu of endeavouring to overthrow them (Magaloni 2008, 7–10). 
Figure 3.1. Determinants of electoral competitiveness 
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Based on Magaloni (2008). 
A self-sustaining equilibrium of low competitiveness depends in electoral autocracies 
upon three factors: united elites, a divided opposition, and mass support. In Magaloni’s 
view, the two first pillars are subordinate to the last, since electoral support, apart from 
its intrinsic value, also possesses instrumental worth by helping the autocrat to deter 
defections from the ranks of the elites and to discourage the opposition from co-
ordinating. On the one hand, supermajorities create an image of the autocrat being in-
vincible and of resistance being futile, while they, on the other hand, enable the autocrat 
to manipulate the institutional landscape to his advantage seeing as altering the elec-
toral rules and instigating political budget cycles mostly requires a legislative majority. 
This means that institutional engineering is in fact an endogenous feature of electoral 
autocracies as long as the autocrat sustains his electoral dominance of which it is a di-
rect result (ibid., 15–19). 
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The lowest row in Figure 3.1 exhibits the arsenal of weapons at the dictator disposal 
when he seeks to shape the electoral game in such a way as to trap the other actors in a 
series of strategic dilemmas that will lead to the desired behaviour. The most functional 
mechanism is co-optation, which aims at forging an oversized coalition through the 
distribution of government spoils and pork, while generating vested interests in the sur-
vival of the regime that enable the dictator to reap the benefits of supermajorities. Pa-
tronage networks work to this end by putting in place a “punishment regime” which 
renders access to spoils conditional upon supporting the incumbent autocrat and sees 
defectors being punished by foregoing patronage, thus keeping the ruling coalition 
united while excluding the opposition and its supporters from the material gains of gov-
ernment. Besides patronage, the threat of repression is employed as a deterrent. The 
dictator does not make use of force systematically or on a grand scale, however, unless 
his hold on power is truly threatened. As long as the autocrat enjoys the electorate’s 
support, also electoral fraud is superfluous, but can be used to contribute to the re-
gime’s image of invincibility by pushing the margin of victory upwards, even though 
the cost of this practise is a legitimacy deficit that may, for instance, rob the dictator of 
foreign aid (see also Simpser 2004). The autocrat furthermore employs institutional 
manipulation and exploits his control over the media to boost his vote share. Lastly, 
though it does not really qualify as a “strategy” in itself, economic growth is neverthe-
less conducive to low levels of competitiveness inasmuch as it generates the resources 
necessary for maintaining patronage networks and the army, while endowing the regime 
with performance legitimacy (Magaloni 2008, 15–24). 
The viability of this hegemonic equilibrium based on mass support and co-optation is 
conditional upon two factors. Firstly, it requires funds, and slacking economic growth is 
consequently detrimental to the dictator’s electoral support as it not only breeds discon-
tent, but also forces the regime to opportunistic economic cycles, which in the long term 
undermine the sustainability of the “punishment regime”. Secondly, the dictator’s ca-
pacity to maintain the support of the masses varies according to the heterogeneity of the 
electorate because the behaviour of the voters is determined by their preferences, and 
certain changes in the composition of the electorate may hence render the voters less 
prone to accept continued non-democratic rule as the price of patronage (ibid.). 
Should the degree of competitiveness rise and the dictator’s electoral support begin 
to wither in a more systematic fashion due to mismanagement of the national economy, 
a shrinking public sector or a proliferation of discontented voters, the incumbent auto-
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crat is expected to take to committing massive fraud enforced with violence in order to 
keep the elites and the opposition from capitalising on the increasing volatility of the 
voters. These strategies are likely to fail in the long run, however, for even if the incum-
bent is in possession of sufficient funds to impose the status quo on his challengers in a 
at least semi-systematic manner, he cannot “control too many people simply by threat-
ening to use force” (Magaloni 2008, 19), he loses his discretionary power over the proc-
ess of institutional change and budget-making, while supermajorities based on fraud are 
incapable of dissuading elites from splitting as they reveal the existence of latent voter 
dissatisfaction. If the opposition under these circumstances succeeds in co-ordinating 
with the electorate, the regime – by now a competitive autocracy – may experience a 
transition to democracy (ibid., 15–24). 
In Magaloni’s formulation, the outcome of the electoral game is in other words in a 
high degree a function of the autocrat’s ability to mobilise mass support, which is vital 
for thwarting challenges from the elites and the opposition (ibid., 79). But before ex-
ploring how different types of voters either comply with or defy this imperative and 
what the consequences of this heterogeneity are for competitiveness at the aggregate 
level, let us take a look at the strategic dilemmas faced by the two remaining players of 
the electoral game – the elites and the opposition – and how these actors react to the 
choice of the electorate to either support or oppose the dictator. 
3.2. The elites and the dilemma of splitting 
To understand the behaviour of the elites within the parameters of the electoral game as 
specified above, Magaloni draws on an ambition-theoretic framework that sees an in-
strumentally rational and utility-seeking politician facing the strategic dilemma of 
whether to stay loyal to the regime or to try her fortune by defecting to the opposition. 
The politician’s utility function when sticking to the ruling coalition is defined as fol-
lows (Magaloni 2008, 45): 
                             (3.1) 
Here, PI is the likelihood of winning under the label of the incumbent party; NI 
stands for the probability of obtaining its nomination; the parenthesis refers to the utility 
derived from holding office, consisting of access to government spoils, SI, and the op-
portunity to advance some ideological goal, II, with α and δ representing the weight the 
politician attaches to these two factors respectively. Lastly, CI is the cost of campaign-
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ing under the label of the incumbent. The corresponding utility the politician can expect 
to derive from running as an opposition candidate is in turn defined as (ibid.): 
                                 (3.2) 
and is identical to equation (3.1), with the addition of expected electoral fraud, E(F). 
These equations allow one to deduce when splits become likely and what sorts of 
politicians are more susceptible to defections. Firstly, splits are less likely when the 
probability of gaining office is greater under the label of the incumbent than under the 
banner of the opposition (PI > PO). This is highly important as it signifies that the domi-
nant strategy of any ambitious politician is to remain loyal to the incumbent even in 
spite of meagre spoils, a hierarchical nomination process and ideological divisions as 
long as there is no real possibility of gaining electoral support in the ranks of another 
party. Secondly, defections are unlikely when the chances of gaining the nomination of 
the party, NI, increase, for example, as a consequence of term-limits. A politician – if 
not elected this time around – will thus remain loyal if he has some probability of being 
elected in the future and the “continuation value”, i.e. the expected benefit from the next 
period onward, exceeds that of splitting. The continuation value also rises when the 
chances of defectors gaining the nomination of an opposition party (NO) are slim, as is 
the case when institutional manipulation raises the entry costs into the electoral game 
(Magaloni 2008, 46–55). 
Thirdly, the risk of splits decreases when access to ample government spoils is made 
dependent upon an affiliation with the ruling coalition (SI > SO). Fourthly, if our hypo-
thetical politician is ideologically motivated and wants to pursue some policy goal or 
democracy, he is more likely to opt for the opposition or a satellite party, whereas more 
pragmatic politicians, who are supposed to make up the majority, defect only when the 
incumbent’s electoral support begins to waver. Fifthly and finally, splits are not ex-
pected to occur when it is more costly to run as an opposition candidate than as a mem-
ber of the ruling coalition (CO > CI). This can be achieved by means of repression, elec-
toral fraud, but also by resorting to media manipulation and by allowing politicised pub-
lic resources to be used as campaign funds (ibid.). 
In a summarised form, the elites are – bar a few strongly ideological politicians – 
likely to remain united when they receive an abundance of spoils, and when one-sided 
media coverage, prejudiced institutions, electoral fraud and the threat of repression 
serve as deterrents. Yet, the crucial factor determining the unity of the elites is the dicta-
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tor’s electoral support. If the image of the invincible incumbent fades away, a prospect 
of gaining office outside of the ruling coalition emerges, and the incentives to split be-
gin to stack up, inducing in consequence the degree of competitiveness to rise. 
3.3. The opposition and the dilemma of co-ordination 
If a politician decides to seek office as the candidate of an opposition party, the question 
on his part becomes how to work together with the voters to dislodge the incumbent 
autocrat. In the electoral game as orchestrated by the dictator, the opposition’s electoral 
success thus hinges on it overcoming three mass co-ordination dilemmas, the first of 
which consists of persuading the voters to shift their support from the incumbent to his 
challengers if the latter are to extricate the former. This dilemma stems from the fact 
that, while the voters’ decision about whether to cast their ballots in favour of the in-
cumbent or the opposition determines who controls the national office, there is no guar-
antee that the electorate will co-ordinate on this point. Consequently, the incumbent 
wins if the number of voters who cast a ballot for him exceeds a certain threshold d (VI 
> d), while the opposition is crowned the victor if its vote share surpasses the said 
threshold (VO > d) (Magaloni 2008, 73–76). 
Second, once the voters are ready to defect, they must be induced to back up the 
strongest opposition party with the best prospects of defeating the autocrat. This di-
lemma derives from the fact that there are at least two opposition parties (O1, O2, O3,… 
On) and the policy space is multidimensional. For the sake of simplicity, the opposition 
parties are supposed to share a common standpoint on a regime/anti-regime dimension 
with all seeking to oust the dictator and establish a democratic regime, but their views 
differ on a socio-economic dimension with the parties thus landing either to the right or 
to the left of the incumbent with regard to their economic policies. The parties may al-
ternatively be divided along ethnic lines, in which case ethnicity is considered to reflect 
differences in the parties’ economic policy stances on the grounds that ethnic groups 
tend to be geographically concentrated and their preferences are largely shaped by what 
they produce (see Bates 1989). If the voters fail to co-ordinate, the divisiveness of the 
opposition plays directly into the hands of the incumbent, for the more fractionalised the 
opposition vote (VO) is, the lower the threshold d required for securing office drops 
(ibid.). 
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Both of these dilemmas are largely mitigated if the opposition forms a unified elec-
toral front behind which the voters can rally. Yet, forming such an alliance is everything 
but unchallenging. On the one hand, the oppositional camp is often divided due to inter-
nal disputes originating from ethnic cleavages, policy strives or personal rivalries. On 
the other, the lack of cohesion is a direct result of the incumbent’s institutional manipu-
lation as the electoral rules are crafted with the outright purpose of dividing the opposi-
tion by creating pay-offs that are non-conducive to coalescence (Magaloni 2008, 25–
26). 
In the case of a divided opposition, the task of pushing up the degree of competitive-
ness turns more demanding. Yet, the opposition can overcome these dilemmas when the 
following conditions hold. Firstly, co-ordination is more probable if one of the parties 
develops into a strong fore-runner around which the voters can coalescence, and for 
which they are prepared to bridge their ideological or ethnical divisions. Strategic vot-
ing means that even if the opposition parties lie on opposite sides of the incumbent party 
on the socio-economic dimension, coalescence is – contrary to  iker’s thesis (1976) of 
how policy divergences on the left-right dimension impede voter co-ordination – still 
possible provided that the regime dimension becomes the predominant point of refer-
ence for the electorate. This requires, however, that the opposition voters behave tacti-
cally, that is to say, they are prepared to set their ideological differences aside for the 
benefit of toppling the incumbent. If a voter in other words prefers, say, a left-wing (OL) 
to a right-wing (OR) opposition party, while both of these are preferable to the incum-
bent (I) in the centre, he is prepared to sacrifice his first-choice in order to cast his ballot 
for the right-wing opposition party if it is the strongest contender to the incumbent 
(Magaloni 2008, 73–76). 
Secondly, for tactical voting to turn into strategic defection that sees the electorate 
desert the dictator en masse, the voters must perceive that a sufficient number of other 
voters are going to defect. The impression of the dictator’s invincibility must in other 
words be broken, for as long as the autocrat remains unassailable behind robust margins 
of victory, voters will not waste their ballot on the strongest opposition party – it being a 
challenger without any real prospects of winning – and possibly risk punishment (ibid.). 
Seeing how co-ordination is thus a tipping-game (compare van de Walle 2002), 
where the behaviour of a comparatively small subset of voters can trigger a massive 
chain reaction, the dissemination of information about the preferences of the other ac-
tors and how the different parties actually fare at the polls plays a central role in 
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unleashing both strategic defections from the ruling party and strategic voting for the 
strongest opposition party (ibid.). 
Information, moreover, plays a part in the third mass co-ordination dilemma which 
pertains to the incumbent’s use of electoral fraud enforced by threats of violence. When 
the dictator chooses to commit fraud, he traps his challengers in a classical prisoner’s 
dilemma, for if one of the opposition parties disputes the election outcome and takes to 
the streets, the other party may stand more to gain from accepting the results than from 
joining the protest. The fact is that playing the “loyal opposition” not only grants the 
party legislative representation and policy-making power, but may also endow it with a 
pay-off in the next election, because as long as the extent of electoral malpractices is not 
common knowledge, opposition voters will react to allegations of fraud on the basis of 
their preconceived ideas about the current regime and their readiness to tolerate vio-
lence. So-called moderate voters do not perceive the regime as very autocratic, which 
leads them to disbelieve allegations of fraud as these could lead the incumbent to retort 
with repression, whereas radical voters with a clear conception of the regime’s auto-
cratic undertone are inclined to believe the cries of fraud and are willing to risk violence 
in making their votes count. As the former will believe the elections to be clean and 
abandon the rebelling party in favour of the acquiescing one or the incumbent, while the 
latter deem the elections to be fraudulent and abandon the acquiescing party for the re-
belling one or abstain from voting altogether, a co-ordinated rebellion is difficult to 
achieve and the dictator gets away with fraud scot-free (Magaloni 2008, 228–237). 
Because the risk of a violent post-electoral conflict rises as the opposition strength-
ens and the dictator becomes more dependent upon fraud, this dilemma gains saliency 
only when the degree of competitiveness is already fairly high, and especially when 
fraud is needed for the dictator to win. This explains why Magaloni chooses to model 
the “strategic game of fraud” as a transition game. If this game is to end in an alterna-
tion of power, the opposition must be able to deter the dictator from stealing the elec-
tions by mobilising enough voters to protest against his transgressions either ex-ante or 
ex-post. This in turn requires that its voters are mostly radical or that electoral fraud is 
made common knowledge, in which case both radical and moderate voters can be mobi-
lised. As long as the dictator has an iron grip of the media, however, the lack of infor-
mation will effectively hamper mass co-ordination from occurring as voters will not be 
able to judge the quality of the elections (ibid., 76, 266–267). 
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To recapitulate, the electoral success of the opposition is tied to its coalescence with 
the electorate. While the dictator is adroit in dividing his challengers with the help of 
institutional manipulation and electoral fraud, the ensuing co-ordination dilemmas can 
nonetheless be mitigated and the margins of victory levelled when the actors gain more 
information about each other’s preferences, which motivates the voters to rally behind 
the strongest opposition contender. But for information to play a role, the voters must be 
willing to defect in the first place. If the electorate is firmly behind the incumbent, the 
opposition has precious little leeway – regardless of whether it stands united or divided. 
3.4. The electorate and the dilemma of voting 
Based on the argument so far, it is clear that the electorate actively contributes to up-
holding a low level of competitiveness – as Magaloni notes, often in spite of slacking 
economic growth, electoral corruption and fruitless policies – this being the “tragic bril-
liance” (Magaloni 2008, 19) of hegemonic rule: although the voters are free to choose, 
their choices are restrained by a sequence of strategic dilemmas that force them, how-
ever reluctantly, to support the incumbent autocrat. Yet, once the electorate does decide 
to “throw the rascals out”, it also plays a crucial role in dislodging the autocrat and in-
augurating democracy. 
In modelling the all-important dilemma of whether to cast a ballot for the incumbent 
or one of the opposition parties, Magaloni departs from the assumption that the voters 
are concerned with finding a political party that can maximise their utility. The voters’ 
consequent voting decisions are based on their expectations about the state of the na-
tional economy as posited by economic voting theory (see Downs 1965; Fiorina 1981), 
but also on their expectations about their own economic situation and fear of post-
electoral violence, as well as on their ideological views (Magaloni 2008, 19; see also 
Domínguez and McCann 1995). 
Leaving the issue of violence aside for the time being, the voters are thought to form 
expectations about the future in the following ways. As regards sociotropic evaluations 
about how a party will handle inflation, growth, wages and other aspects of the national 
economy if elected, the voters are assumed to make their calculations using Bayesian 
logic. The voters in other words hold some prior knowledge about how the party can be 
expected to perform, which they then revise in the light of new information. The ex-
pected economic performance of the incumbent (  
   ) is thus the weighted average of the 
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mean economic performance observed by the voters during their lifetime (   
    ), updated 
with information about the current state of the economy (  ) and the incumbent’s cam-
paign promises (     
 ) to which the voters may attach diverging weights (w0, w1, w2) 
(Magaloni 2008, 57), and yields the following calculus: 
  
    
 
        
      
                 
         (3.4) 
What equation (3.4) reveals is that while economic growth induces the voters to sup-
port the dictator, they do not necessarily turn against him in times of an economic reces-
sion, provided that the autocrat has delivered in the past and the opposition parties are 
an uncertain choice. This is the case when the latter have never governed, and their 
campaign promises therefore cannot be evaluated in the light of an earlier track-
record.
23
 Although the voters will hence stick to the known devil even when the econ-
omy takes a downturn, their patience is not infinite: if the economy deters in a more 
systematic fashion, the voters increasingly lose their belief in the incumbent’s capacity 
to manage the economy and are more willing to take a risk by switching to the opposi-
tion (Magaloni 2008, 56–64). 
The voters are also presumed to make pocketbook evaluations regarding the personal 
gain they can expect from the parties in the form of cash transfers, land and jobs. Be-
cause the incumbent has an interest in maintaining an oversized coalition and is unilat-
erally in control of government transfers and programmes, he engages in clientelism to 
reward loyal voters, while withdrawing funds from those who opt for the opposition. If 
this “punishment regime” is effective, the voters will infer that their defection will be 
punished, and the more dependent they are on these transfers, the greater the utility they 
draw from supporting the incumbent. Punishment requires, however, that the incumbent 
is capable both of screening between followers and adversaries, and of targeting side-
payments only to those voters who actually do case their ballots for the incumbent after 
having received their payment. While the latter can be achieved by distributing only 
excludable material benefits instead of public goods, the former requires that the voters 
                                                   
23
 The expected economic performance of opposition party O (     ) thus constitutes an unsolvable equa-
tion:  
      
 
 
     
   
which combines the voters’ diffuse primary knowledge (
 
 
) with a normal distribution (     
 ), where both 
μ and σ2 are unknown. This uncertainty (σ) is not constant, however, and can vary, for example, with 
media coverage or with the propensity of a party to change its policy stances (Magaloni 2008, 58–59). 
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can be somehow effectively monitored. Clientelism subsequently promises to be suc-
cessful in smaller rural communities, where it is easier for local party cadres to gather 
knowledge about the citizens and their voting behaviour (Magaloni 2008, 64–68). 
The third factor to influence the voters’ behaviour consists of their ideological stand-
points relative to those of the alternative parties. Here, the policy space is again thought 
to be multidimensional with a socio-economic dimension reflecting the electorate’s 
concerns about a number of economic policies, such as social policy and taxation, and a 
regime dimension that pertains to its views on political issues regarding democracy, 
electoral reform and the protection of human rights. These two dimensions vary inde-
pendently of one another, with ethnicity once more mapping onto salient economic pol-
icy divisions (ibid., 69). 
One can begin to appreciate the strategic dilemma the voter i faces if one examines 
his utility function, which reveals the relationship between ideological concerns and 
transfers to be a trade-off (ibid.): 
                              
        (3.5) 
where the voter’s utility of voting for the incumbent equals that of voting for the opposi-
tion party O as long as the utility difference between the incumbent autocrat and the 
opposition with regard to expected economic performance (        ) and ideology 
            is the equivalent of the minimum transfer needed to make the voter opt 
for the dictator (   
 ). The constants β, α, and γ once again refer to the weight the voter 
attaches to these considerations. 
From this, two propositions about why voters decide to opt for the incumbent and 
continued authoritarian rule can be derived. Voters may, on the one hand, support the 
ruling government “sincerely” on the grounds that they are convinced of the incum-
bent’s superior capacity to manage the economy, or due to ideological motives, al-
though – as Magaloni points out – ideology seems to be of little importance in explain-
ing why voters support dictators. On the other, voters may support the autocrat “strate-
gically” for fear of financial punishment. Conversely, it can be conjectured that, in order 
for the voters to defect to the opposition and raise the level of competitiveness, the util-
ity differential derived from economic performance and ideological propinquity must 
outweigh the financial punishment the voters incur by being deprived patronage (ibid., 
69–72, 79–81). 
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It is one of the key insights of Magaloni’s theory that while all voters face this di-
lemma, some are in a better position than others to solve it to the advantage of the oppo-
sition, and that the degree of electoral competitiveness – paralleling modernisation the-
ory – accordingly mirrors a society’s socio-demographic heterogeneity. With the help of 
equation (3.5) and the propositions about voter behaviour that Magaloni draws from it, 
this relationship can be explored empirically by working out six hypotheses. 
Firstly, the price of buying votes (  
 ) increases as the ideological difference between 
the incumbent party and the voters grows on either the socio-economic or the regime 
dimension. Co-optation consequently turns more expensive the more the voters either 
disagree with the economic policies of the incumbent, or commit themselves to democ-
ratisation (Magaloni 2008, 69–72). Remembering that ethnic affiliations are thought to 
reflect economic interests and that a plurality of ethnic groups thus translates into a plu-
rality of potentially conflicting preferences, the following can be hypothesised as con-
cerns ideological differences about economic policy: 
H1a: The less the voters agree with the incumbent’s economic policies, the higher the 
degree of competitiveness. 
H1b: The more ethnically heterogeneous a nation, the higher the degree of competi-
tiveness. 
Secondly and pertaining to the regime dimension, the price of securing compliancy 
(  
 ) increases the less the voters are concerned about financial punishment, viz. the 
smaller the weight   attached to it is. Because side-payments generate a higher “mar-
ginal utility” among poor voters than among middle-class voters and the rich, the latter 
are more capable of making “ideological investments” in democracy and are thus likely 
to vote for the opposition. The former’s calculations tend in turn to prioritise transfers, 
rendering poor voters typically the most loyal supporters of the dictator (ibid., 69–72). 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The richer the median voter, the higher the degree of competitiveness. 
Thirdly and relating to the previous hypothesis, the price of votes (  
 ) goes up when 
the economic situation deteriorates. As long as the economy grows, the voters have a 
reason to support the incumbent sincerely – this being true of the rich as well – and a 
healthy economy may thus be expected to cancel out the effects of socio-economic 
voter heterogeneity to some extent, even though this tactic may eventually turn counter-
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productive as increasing wealth will over time translate into a higher median income 
(Magaloni 2008, 69–72). Also the short-term incentive of economic growth is evanes-
cent in the face of economic recessions, however, which gives rise to the hypothesis: 
H3: The less economic growth, the higher the degree of competitiveness. 
Fourthly, Magaloni proposes that the effectiveness of the “punishment regime” in de-
terring voter exit is conditional upon the incumbent government being able to screen 
between its friends and foes, and to target the former with spoils. This is a feasible as-
sumption in small and homogeneous rural communities, where the incumbent can 
gather local knowledge about the electorate. In such an environment, the autocrat also 
finds it easier to get away with violating the secrecy of the ballot (ibid.). On the basis of 
this, it can be hypothesised that: 
H4: The more urban the nation, the higher the degree of competitiveness. 
The last element can now be added to the picture, namely the voters’ expectations 
about post-electoral violence, which influence their choice between the opposition and 
the incumbent in the following way (ibid., 78): 
                (3.6) 
                        
in which case p denotes the probability of the incumbent winning a majority, whereas R 
stands for the value of maintaining the existent political regime without a post-electoral 
conflict. The voter’s utility of voting for the opposition is a lottery between the election 
ending in a peaceful alternation in power (A) and a post-electoral conflict (V), which 
ranges in severity from temporary political instability to outright civil war (V ≥ 0) and 
where violence occurs with the probability q. 
Here, the voter’s utility of voting for the incumbent grows in tandem with the risk of 
post-electoral violence (V > 0), which logically follows from the voter knowing that, by 
supporting the opposition, he may prompt an authoritarian response, which might end in 
violence erupting.
24
 The risk of this happening in turn increases as the opposition gains 
strength and the dictator becomes more willing to risk a violent conflict in order to re-
main in power, viz. when p decreases. As long as an opposition victory is a virtual im-
                                                   
24
 The voter’s complete utility function of supporting the incumbent thus reads (Magaloni 2008, 55): 
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possibility, the risks of violence are in other words expected to be insignificant, and this 
calculation can by means of analogy therefore be assumed to be more salient in com-
petitive authoritarian regimes than in hegemonic ones (Magaloni 2008, 78). 
As the section on the co-ordination dilemmas of the opposition already disclosed, the 
risk of violence is in Magaloni’s theory linked to a transition game involving electoral 
fraud and opposition protests. Here, the effect that the voters’ expectations of violence 
have on the degree of competitiveness in the elections following the protests was, under 
conditions of imperfect voter information, thought to be a function of their preconcep-
tions about the nature of the regime and their tolerance of violence (ibid., chapter 8). 
Unfortunately, tying the impact of violence to this very specific context precludes the 
possibility of repression having an impact on voter behaviour and altering the conse-
quences of voter heterogeneity on competitiveness irrespective of post-electoral opposi-
tion protests. In order not to ignore the broader implications of violence on the calculus 
of voting, I decide to interpret Magaloni’s observation of the voters’ dislike for violence 
in a more general sense, and the last hypothesis to be investigated thus reads: 
H5: The more repressive the regime, the lower the degree of competitiveness. 
3.5. Discussion – is the Mexican case representative? 
By means of a conclusion, Magaloni’s (2008) argument thus amounts to a convincing 
“alternative” recipe for electoral competitiveness, whose empirical and theoretical value 
the author demonstrates throughout her book by assiduously testing its many implica-
tions using a broad array of sophisticated methods and versatile data. The result of this 
undertaking is one of the most meticulous and deep-going analyses to date of the me-
chanics that accounted for the exceptional durability of the PRI regime (1929–2000) and 
its eventual transition to democracy (Duquette 2007). 
Notwithstanding the notable insights the theory has produced about the Mexican 
case, then, its heavy emphasis on this particular country also constitutes a potential 
source of concern with regard to its broader applicability. Certainly, Magaloni (2008, 
32–37) takes care to emphasise that her argument is not the outcome of a case study 
sensu stricto, as it has been modelled on the larger group of hegemonic party regimes 
and competitive regimes displaying a tendency of developing into such systems. Like 
most other empirical theories in the field of comparative politics, Magaloni’s argument 
may therefore be characterised as a middle-range theory, whose explanatory powers are 
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in fact, more or less, delimited to a particular context – in this instance to hegemonic 
authoritarian regimes. But as Lauth, Pickel, and Pickel (2009, 25–27) point out, al-
though restricting the scope of the theory in this fashion is largely a precondition for its 
empirical testability, it does come at a cost, since it may compromise the generalisabil-
ity of the argument. There is in other words reason to ponder how well Magaloni’s the-
ory can be expected to fare in explaining variation in the degree of competitiveness be-
yond realm of its original context? 
On closer inspection, there is indeed some concern that the perforce delimited ex-
planatory scope of Magaloni’s argument may cause problems for the more global analy-
sis carried out later in this thesis. It must, for instance, be recognised that focusing on 
the very particular regime type of hegemonic parties regimes causes the theory – for all 
its tribute to the art of manipulative ”heresthetics” (Riker 1983) – to explore the work-
ings of competitive authoritarian elections in a certain institutional context, namely that 
of a consolidated party system and, in particular, a strong ruling party with dense organ-
isational structures. In this view, the incumbent party is in fact amongst the most in-
strumental factors in keeping the elites united and in maintaining a functioning “pun-
ishment regime” by establishing the necessary links to the electorate. Together with the 
opposition parties, it also serves to structure political competition by linking policy 
preferences to partisanship (see also Brownlee 2007). 
In the absence of these conditions, however, it is not difficult to conceive that the 
functions of authoritarian elections may take on a form very different from that envis-
aged by Magaloni’s theory. An illustrative example of this is provided by the idea of 
maintaining a “punishment regime” in autocratically ruled monarchies. This is a regime 
type that is typically characterised by weak parliaments with scant policy-making pow-
ers and, consequently, elections that are devoid of all political meaning. With elections 
thus degenerating into a mere game for patronage, electoral participation turns into an 
act of accepting and legitimating the fundamental nature of the regime – regardless of 
party label – while non-participation and abstention become the only true outlets for 
anti-system protest. Under these circumstances, a punishment regime as understood by 
Magaloni is clearly superfluous for creating “a market for political loyalty”, as defec-
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tions from one party to another do not reflect political dissidence, but rather mirror the 
ability of the candidates to deliver the goods (Blaydes 2006b; Lust-Okar 2009a).
25
 
The above example enables a smooth transition to another implicit institutional pre-
condition of the theory, namely the form of government. Although the evidence on this 
point must still be considered suggestive at best, it seems that there are systematic dif-
ferences in how different types of incumbents view elections and electoral outcomes. 
Accordingly, since the legitimacy of monarchs does not hinge upon electoral support, 
they have been argued to take less of an interest in mobilising voters in support of the 
ruling party and in attaining supermajorities at the polls than presidents and premiers. In 
fact, by ruling over a fragmented parliament, crowned heads-of-state may legitimate 
their own position as arbiters between the dissonant parties (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 
2009, 413). Contrary to Magaloni’s theory, a high degree of competitiveness would in 
this instance actually benefit the ruling autocrat. 
Also its understandably heavy focus on the political and social context of Mexico 
may have infused Magaloni’s theory with more idiosyncratic influences that do not nec-
essarily fit the experiences of other countries – a point lucidly demonstrated by the role 
allotted to the opposition parties. Indeed, because opposition boycotts appear not to 
have been a prevalent feature of Mexican elections during the PRI-regime, this tactic is 
wholly absent from the theory. Something similar is true of protests, as Magaloni delim-
its the stratagem to a very particular context by modelling it as a component of the tran-
sition game evolving around electoral fraud. While this may again do justice to the 
Mexican case, the theory is thereby rendered incapable of incorporating protests that 
take on a different form, pertain to some other aspect of the elections or are pre-electoral 
(see Schedler 2009b). In addition, the very fact that Magaloni in doing so bundles to-
gether such versatile phenomena as protests, violence, electoral fraud and regime transi-
tions, makes it at times less than clear what the consequences of an opposition protest 
on its electoral fortunes are supposed to be. This is especially true of the outcome de-
noted as “violence” in the transition game. Here, the fraudulent nature of the elections is 
assumed to be common knowledge or its voters are predominantly radical, which en-
ables the opposition parties to mount a united protest against the dictator, who may then 
take to an authoritarian crackdown in order to stay in power (Magaloni 2008, 230–231). 
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 This suggests that, contrary to what Brownlee (2007) claims, elections contribute to regime reproduc-
tion independently of the effect of political parties (see also Blaydes 2008; Reuter and Gandhi 2011). 
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To specify the consequences of this outcome further is, however, exceedingly challeng-
ing as they could range between anything from the vote share of the opposition rising if 
it gains concessions from the regime, to the opposition parties being severely weakened 
should the autocrat suppress the protests brutally. 
What’s more, the “Mexican bias” may be salient also as regards the issue that is cen-
tral to this investigation, namely the question of how different types of voter heteroge-
neity spill over to different types of voter behaviour and affect thus the degree of com-
petitiveness at the aggregate level. In Magaloni’s theory, voter heterogeneity is mod-
elled by enabling voters with dissimilar backgrounds to place diverging weights on the 
considerations in the voting calculus. Although this precludes the very real possibility of 
voter heterogeneity manifesting itself as different decision rules – i.e. that the voting 
calculus itself may diverge, for instance, on the basis of the voter’s level of political 
awareness (see Bartle 2005; Roy 2009) – the approach is, following Rivers (1988, 737), 
justifiable as the goal of the theory is not so much to “characterize voter decision proc-
esses” as it is to account for the outcomes of elections by predicting vote choice with 
reference to socio-demographic factors. 
The question of interest hence becomes whether the socio-demographic predictors 
that Magaloni has chosen to include in her model are representative of voters’ identities 
beyond the Mexican context. This is moot dilemma, to say the least, as is well-known 
from the literature on social cleavages and party-systems. The fact of the matter is that a 
discrepancy is likely to exist in any given society between the number of latent and poli-
ticised identities, as not all societal cleavages gain saliency in the political sphere. The 
identities that are of importance to voting behaviour will thus invariably differ from 
country to country, but may also fluctuate over time within countries (Evans and White-
field 2000; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Stoll 2008). 
In view of this, even a superficial perusal of the broader literature dealing with socio-
demographic diversity and politically salient identities is likely to expose Magaloni’s 
selection as a rather limited one (e.g. Casstevens and Press 1963; Lijphart 1999; Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967). Indeed, whilst income, place of residence and ethnicity are arguably 
among the most important identities to mediate the vote choice (e.g. Koetzle 1998; Lee 
1971; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005), it requires no great leap of the scholarly imagination 
to expand this list with such factors as education, gender or religion (e.g. Choi 2007; 
Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010), even though these were not shown to have an influ-
ence in the elections surveyed by Magaloni (2008, chapter 6). 
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Having said this, the limitations of Magaloni’s theory may not be as severe as the ac-
count above might let one believe. For one, since the literature on electoral authoritari-
anism has so far not succeeded in identifying any systematic differences in the mecha-
nisms that drive hegemonic and competitive authoritarian rule, the “institutional anoma-
lies” discussed here are in fact concentrated to a fairly small group of regimes, which 
makes them easily containable in the subsequent analysis.
26
 Besides, while the theory in 
its current form may indeed leave room for further refinement, the short-term effects of 
opposition boycotts can for the purpose of this thesis be included without much loss to 
the integrity of the original argument. 
Finally with regard to the voting calculus, then, the parsimony of Magaloni’s theory 
may in fact turn out to be more of a strength than a weakness when expanding the scope 
of the argument. Indeed, economic issues can fairly safely be assumed to be salient in 
virtually any political system, the same being true of patronage and repression when 
delimiting the argument to only encompass autocratic systems. Only ethnicity may be 
regarded as potentially problematic in this regard, as not all party systems build upon 
ethnic cleavages. And what about those potentially important identities that are missing 
from the calculus? Well, seeing how the right-left party scale that is used to model the 
ideological dimension is also known to map onto a corresponding value dimension of 
conservatism-radicalism, the potential of Magaloni’s theory to track various political 
identities may in fact be considerably larger than one might think at first glance, even 
though the theory does not allow for an explicit analysis of this in its current formula-
tion. 
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 Indeed, a majority of these cases has to be eliminated from the analysis as their lack of political parties 
altogether or the considerable number of independent candidates that characterise their elections defy my 
measure of competitiveness. 
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4. Data, operationalisation and the method 
The rationale of this section is to form a methodological basis for the empirical analysis 
of voter heterogeneity and electoral competitiveness that is to follow in chapter five. To 
this purpose, the chapter unfolds as follows. The first section presents and discusses the 
choice of data and operationalisation for the universe of cases and the variables. The 
second section examines the method and the challenges that arise from using a regres-
sion analysis with so-called time-series cross-sectional data. In the course of both these 
subsections, the chapter also addresses some of the methodological shortcomings of 
earlier studies of electoral autocracy, and seeks to improve upon these by introducing 
novel data and more rigorous methodological tools. 
4.1. Data and variables 
Drawing on a long and venerable tradition in comparative politics, this thesis operates 
with so-called aggregate data. Understood as numerical depictions of macro-level social 
processes, such data are considered particularly well-suited for the task that lies at the 
heart of the current investigation, namely that of tracing general patterns involving vari-
ous collective actors across multiple countries (Lauth, Pickel, and Pickel 2009, 87–90). 
Obviously, the choice of using aggregate data is natural also for the simple reason that 
no survey data are available for such an extensive time period and such an eclectic 
group of countries as the one employed here. 
In spite of these considerations, this type of data also harbours some potential caveats 
that are worth discussing before moving on to present the actual datasets and the indi-
vidual variables. As Lauth, Pickel and Pickel (2009, 89–90) explain, aggregate data 
analyses tend to suffer from two distinct problems, which both stem from their reliance 
on datasets that have habitually not been created with the particular research project in 
mind. This may, on the one hand, compromise the reliability of the data as the scholar 
has no means by which to check the data and the coding for errors. On the other, differ-
ent datasets may comprise different, country-specific measures of the same phenomena 
that are not by default compatible with one another. Unemployment or inflation rates 
are in other words not necessarily comparable across countries and datasets. 
There are also additional problems with the choice of data and the choice of indica-
tors. Above all, it must be realised that many of the phenomena central to the study at 
hand are not only exceedingly complex and not readily quantifiable, but also covert and 
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secretive by nature, thus complicating the collection of reliable data. Even though I seek 
to mitigate these problems to as high a degree as possible by using only a limited num-
ber of datasets and measures that are commonly employed in the literature on electoral 
autocracy, concerns of validity and reliability cannot be wholly eliminated.
27
 In the 
words of Schedler (2009b, 188), non-democratic elections are haunted by “irritating 
mixtures of noise and silence, rhetoric and rumor, absolute certainty and absolute dis-
trust” which spill over to “deep epistemological uncertainties”. In less eloquent terms, 
this signalises that the variables employed in this thesis to measure such phenomena as 
electoral closeness, manipulation and fraud not only constitute a rather constricted se-
lection of all the various strategies that are open to the relevant actors even in the light 
of Magaloni’s (2008) theory; they must also – at best – be considered proxy indicators. 
A final point worth considering is the debate evolving around “ecological regres-
sion”. At the heart of this dispute lies the claim that the use of essentially macro-level 
data to investigate essentially micro-level processes amounts to an “ecological fallacy”. 
In this view, studies based on macro-data are considered biased as only individual-level 
data (i.e. survey data) are believed to produce accurate inferences about processes in-
volving individuals (e.g. Robinson 1950). Although this critique is undergirded by the 
fact that analyses of voting behaviour carried out with data from different levels of ag-
gregation tend indeed to produce diverging results (Scarbrough 1991, 361), this obser-
vation does not resolve the matter unambiguously in favour of survey data. Quite on the 
contrary, it has led some scholars to accuse studies relying on individual-level data of 
falling prey to an “individual fallacy”. In this light, macro-level data emerge as valid 
while micro-level data are deemed biased by people’s subjective assessments on the 
grounds that these are actually endogenous to the vote choice, that is, rather a conse-
quence than a cause of it (e.g. Erikson 2004; Kramer 1983; van der Eijk et al. 2007). 
This ongoing debate appears to allow for a twofold conclusion about the choice of 
data in this thesis. On the one hand, because neither macro- nor micro-level data can be 
considered inherently superior when studying voter behaviour, the use of aggregate data 
must be regarded a ceteris paribus valid approach. On the other, because macro- and 
micro-data nevertheless appear to yield slightly diverging results, the decision to use 
aggregate-level data is at the same time likely to influence the conclusions of the inves-
                                                   
27
 A measure is considered reliable if it yields constant results, whereas it qualifies as valid if it measures 
that which it is intended to measure (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 25). 
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tigation at hand. The level of aggregation may in other words constitute a source of dis-
crepancy between the findings of this thesis with its focus on the macro-level, and those 
of Magaloni’s original study with its emphasis of the micro-level. 
4.1.1. Universe of cases 
In order to test the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter, I compile a time-series 
cross-sectional dataset – a dataset that combines a temporal dimension with a spatial 
one for each unit (Wooldridge 2009, 10) – which covers all structurally competitive 
elections held at the national level in authoritarian regimes between 1974 and 2006. 
Deviating slightly from the definition by Hyde and Marinov (2010), the unit of analysis 
– an election – is understood as a race for either the national executive or legislative 
body, where the casting of ballots has began on election day, although the elections may 
later have been cancelled, postponed or annulled (see also Hyde and Marinov 2009, 14–
16). The chosen time frame reflects in turn the empirical and theoretical associations 
between electoral authoritarianism and the third wave of democratisation, even though 
the availability of data forces me to right-hand censor the series. 
The universe of cases is created by merging together two datasets which both opera-
tionalise one of the twin aspects of elections that are of interest to this thesis, namely 
electoral competition and authoritarianism. Thinking back to the discussion in section 
2.1, competition was identified as a necessary structural prerequisite for competitive-
ness. As Hyde and Marinov (2010, 10–17) and Bogaards (2007) show, however, stu-
dents of electoral authoritarianism have, in the absence of an appropriate measure with 
which to gauge this pivotal feature, been struggling to approximate its presence with 
various suboptimal strategies. Existent studies have thus tried to infer the existence of 
competition, for example, from outcome based measures that exclude elections in which 
the incumbent wins by a certain margin (e.g. Diamond 2002; Magaloni 2008); from 
more general aggregated datasets (e.g. Brownlee 2009a) such as Freedom House (2011), 
Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) or the Dataset of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 
2001); or from novel taxonomies reflecting qualitative differences between regimes 
such as the level of repression or media control (e.g. Levitsky and Way 2010a). 
Unfortunately, all of these strategies are fraught with problems. Thus, the first one 
conflates competition with competitiveness, establishes arbitrary vote or seat thresholds, 
and risks committing a selection bias known as coding on the dependent variable (see 
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King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 129–132).28 The second alternative in turn utilises 
indices that have not been designed to screen between competitive and non-competitive 
elections, and whose rankings conflate theoretically relevant electoral events with non-
relevant ones. Finally, the third strategy by necessity implies making subjective evalua-
tions about how much repression or media control is sufficient to quench competition 
(Hyde and Marinov 2010, 10–17). 
The National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy dataset (hereafter NELDA) 
by Hyde and Marinov (2010) allows me to improve upon the methodological founda-
tion of the literature by providing a clear set of rules with which to delineate the uni-
verse of competitive elections. NELDA constitutes a first attempt at an election-based 
measure for separating competitive elections from non-competitive ones, and although 
the dataset has on the grounds of its newness not been broadly used yet, tests concern-
ing its face validity and inter-coder reliability speak in its favour (Beaulieu and Hyde 
2009, 17–19), as do its simple and clear coding rules alongside its broad scope. At the 
moment, NELDA (v.2) comprises over 2000 election events between 1945 and 2006 in 
all independent countries with a population of more than 500,000. Apart from measur-
ing competition, the dataset also features over fifty binary variables that gauge various 
aspects of the elections such as whether the incumbent ran and whether fraud occurred. 
Because the data have been culled from a variety of sources, the reader is referred to the 
NELDA codebook for a more detailed listing of sources used. 
In line with the conceptualisation presented earlier in chapter two, Hyde and Marinov 
(2010, 18–19) measure competition as the joint product of three binary attributes. Elec-
tions are thus coded as competitive if they prompt affirmative answers to all of the fol-
lowing questions: 
1. Is opposition allowed? 
2. Are multiple parties legal? 
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 An excellent example of the problems that arise from coding on the dependent variable is provided by 
the study of Roessler and Howard (2008), which seeks to explain the regime reproducing effects of elec-
tions in hegemonic authoritarian regimes. To begin with, Roessler and Howard operationalise hegemonic 
regimes as systems scoring 3 or higher on the Freedom House, or five or lower on the Polity IV scale, and 
in which the winner of the elections gains more than 70 per cent of the parliamentary seats or presidential 
vote. They then proceed to investigate the stability of these regimes relative to other regime types, and 
come to the conclusion that hegemonic regimes are in fact the most stable systems as the incumbents in 
their sample never lose a single election – something that would indeed be quite a feat seeing that 70 per 
cent of the seats or the vote would count as an overwhelming victory in practically any electoral system! 
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3. Is more than one candidate allowed on the ballot? 
The gist of the third question should be self-evident, but the first two may seem con-
fusingly similar. Despite their close affinity, they are in fact designed to tap into two 
different dimensions of competition. The first question captures situations in which sev-
eral parties are legal, but these political entities are not independent of the regime – i.e. 
they constitute satellite parties – and no opposition consequently exists de facto. The 
second query in contrast pertains to cases in which opposition parties are not legally 
allowed to form, but opposition candidates are allowed to compete in practice. Further-
more, it is worth noticing that these criteria are not violated even if some (but not all) 
opposition parties are banned from taking part in the elections. 
In order to filter out the elections which in accordance with the democracy definition 
provided in chapter two are held in autocratic regimes, I utilise the Democracy and Dic-
tatorship dataset (hereafter DD). This index constitutes an update by Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland (2010) of the democracy measure originally introduced by Alvarez et al. 
(1996) and used by Przeworski et al. (2000). In its present form, the index covers 199 
independent countries between 1946 and 2008 which are coded dichotomously as either 
democratic or autocratic using data from Banks’ (2011) Cross-National Time Series 
Data Archives. To recapitulate briefly, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010, 69–72; 
see also Alvarez et al. 1996, 7–14 for a more detailed discussion) define democracy as a 
system in which governmental offices are filled by means of contested elections, and 
disaggregate this definition into three dimensions or attributes: ex-ante uncertainty, ex-
post irreversibility and repeatability. Quoting the authors, this means that a regime must 
in operationalisational terms meet all of the following four rules to be coded as democ-
ratic, and conversely fall short of at least one criterion in order to qualify as autocratic: 
1. The chief executive must be popularly elected or chosen by a body that was 
itself popularly elected. 
2. The legislature must be popularly elected. 
3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections. 
4. An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that 
brought the incumbent to office must have taken place. 
Again, the first two criteria dealing with offices being filled by elections appear clear 
enough, but the two latter points covering contestation require some elaboration. Defin-
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ing a party as “an independent list of candidates presented to voters in elections” (Alva-
rez et al. 1996, 8), the “party-rule” obviously excludes no-party regimes, single-party 
regimes and regimes holding elections which present voters with only one list. How-
ever, this category also takes into account a special case of incumbents who, after hav-
ing gained office via contested elections, exploit their power to do away with contesta-
tion. Because this goes against the repeatability rule, such regimes are coded as non-
democratic starting from the beginning of the incumbent’s term (ibid). 
The “alternation-rule” is more complicated, with a problem arising from a small 
group of regimes that refute unambiguous coding. Although these regimes live up to the 
three first criteria, the ruling party has won at least two consecutive terms at the polls, 
and an alternation in power is therefore yet to materialise. As Alvarez et al. remark, it is 
under such circumstances impossible to observationally tell apart a democratic ruler 
who enjoys genuine popular support but would step down should he lose, from an auto-
cratic incumbent who organises elections he will not lose and would not step down even 
if he were defeated, unless one is prepared to craft distinctions via means of what the 
authors term “subjective evaluations” concerning, for example, the severity of electoral 
fraud (ibid., 8–13; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, 69–72). 
Alvarez et al. provide a partial solution to this dilemma in the shape of retroactive 
coding. Should the incumbent party eventually lose and step down, the whole time dur-
ing which the party has held office under the same broad electoral rules that brought it 
to power is coded as democratic. Yet even with such coding, some cases are bound to 
remain that cannot be classified without running the risk of entering either a false nega-
tive (type II error) or a false positive (type I error). The perfect example of this is Bot-
swana, where the Botswana Democratic Party has been in power since 1966, achieving 
impressive victories in what most scholars consider free and fair elections. Even though 
many indices hence code the country as democratic, in the absence of “better” informa-
tion such ambivalent cases are coded here as autocracies (Alvarez et al. 1996, 10–13).29 
Retroactive coding is obviously not an ideal solution, as it rests upon the assumption 
that the incumbent’s current behaviour is indicative of what he would have done at an 
earlier point in time. It may also introduce a small bias into the analysis in the shape of 
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 Although the authors enable the user of the dataset to recode or remove the cases in question, I decide 
to employ the original coding. In DD, the proportion of country years coded as autocratic for failing to 
live up to the alternation rule only is 11.9 per cent, with most of the instances being successor countries of 
the USSR (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010, 71). 
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false negatives, as pointed out by other scholars (e.g. Magaloni 2008, 34–35). Neverthe-
less, if one evaluates the DD dataset along the three dimensions set down by Munck and 
Verkuilen (2002) in their influential evaluation of alternative democracy measures – 
conceptualisation, measurement and aggregation – the index makes up for this short-
coming with a constantly good performance on all three fronts. Conceptually, it offers a 
clear, albeit minimalist, definition of democracy that is logically disaggregated into at-
tributes. Operationally, it pays deference to issues of validity, reliability and replicabil-
ity by employing well-considered indicators and providing transparent as well as de-
tailed coding rules, and by making the used data public. Finally as far as aggregation 
goes, it uses a simple additive rule that is grounded in theory (see also Adcock and Col-
lier 2001; Bernhagen 2009; Collier and Adcock 1999). 
In this view, DD fares very well when compared to its two most serious rivals, the 
Freedom House (2011) and the Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) indices. The 
many inadequacies of these two – starting with the conceptualisation of democracy as 
“freedom” (FH) or as “patterns of authority” (Polity); continuing with the subjective 
and constantly changing coding rules of FH and the inclusion of redundant attributes in 
Polity; and leading up to their opaque and arbitrary aggregation into a 7-point (FH) and 
a 21-point (Polity) scale respectively – have received sufficient attention in the literature 
so as not to demand a thorough discussion here (compare Bernhagen 2009; Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Coppedge 2002; Gleditsch and Ward 1997; Lauth 2004; 
Marshall et al. 2002; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Müller and Pickel 2007).
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Combining NELDA with DD yields a total of 422 observations within the specified 
time period. However, a number of elections have to be omitted from the analysis due to 
insufficient data. Several elections, including all those held in Bahrain, Jordan and Syria 
are also excluded on the grounds that these feature no identifiable political parties, and 
the degree of competitiveness can thus not be measured with the instruments employed 
in this thesis. After these omissions, 381 elections in 84 countries as listed in Table 4.1 
remain.  
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 Another bone of contention with regard to using DD arises from Alvarez et al. (1996) using a dichoto-
mous measure instead of a graded one (Collier and Adcock 1999, 538), which has rekindled an old debate 
about the concept validity and measurement reliability of competing democracy indices (compare e.g. 
Bollen 1980; Bollen and Jackman 1989; Coppedge and Reinicke 1990; Dahl 1971; Doorenspleet 2005; 
Elkins 2000; Geddes 1999; Sartori 1970). 
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Table 4.1. List of elections included in the analysis 
Afghanistan 
2004 P 
Algeria 
1991 L 
1995 P 
1997 L 
2002 L 
2004 P 
Angola 
1992 C 
Azerbaijan 
1992 P 
1993 P 
1998 P 
2003 P 
Bangladesh 
1978 P 
1979 L 
1981 P 
Belarus 
1994 P 
2001 P 
2006 P 
Bolivia 
1978 P 
1980 P 
1980 L 
Bosnia and Herze-
govina 
1996 C 
1998 P 
2000 L 
2002 C 
2006 P 
Botswana 
1974 L 
1979 L 
1984 L 
1989 L 
1994 L 
1999 L 
2004 L 
Brazil 
1974 L 
1978 L 
1982 L 
Burkina Faso 
1978 C 
1992 L 
 
1997 L 
1998 P 
2002 L 
2005 P 
Cambodia 
1998 L 
2003 L 
Cameroon 
1992 C 
1997 C 
2002 L 
2004 P 
Central African Rep. 
1981 P 
2005 C 
Chad 
1996 P 
1997 L 
2001 P 
2002 L 
2006 P 
Chile 
1989 C 
Comoros 
1996 C 
Congo, Rep. 
1989 L 
2002 C 
Congo, Democratic 
Rep. of 
2006 C 
Cote d’Ivoire 
1990 C 
1995 C 
2000 C 
Cyprus 
1976 L 
1981 L 
Djibouti 
1992 L 
1993 P 
1997 L 
1999 P 
2003 L 
Ecuador 
1978 P 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
1979 L 
1984 L 
 
1987 L 
1990 L 
2005 C 
El Salvador 
1974 L 
1976 L 
1977 P 
1978 P 
Equatorial Guinea 
1993 L 
1996 P 
1999 L 
2002 P 
2004 L 
Ethiopia 
1995 L 
2000 L 
2005 L 
Fiji 
1977 L 
1977 L 
1982 L 
1987 L 
2001 L 
2006 L 
Gabon 
1990 L 
1993 P 
1996 L 
1998 P 
2001 L 
2005 P 
2006 L 
Gambia, The 
1977 L 
1982 C 
1987 C 
1992 C 
1996 C 
1997 C 
2001 P 
2002 L 
2006 P 
Georgia 
1992 L 
1995 P 
1999 L 
2000 P 
2003 L 
 
Ghana 
1992 C 
Guatemala 
1982 C 
1985 C 
Guinea 
1993 P 
1995 L 
1998 P 
2002 L 
2003 P 
Guinea-Bissau 
1994 C 
1999 C 
Guyana 
1980 L 
1985 L 
1992 L 
1997 L 
2001 L 
2006 L 
Haiti 
1988 P 
1990 C 
2000 C 
2006 C 
Honduras 
1981 C 
Indonesia 
1977 L 
1982 L 
1987 L 
1992 L 
1997 L 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
2000 L 
2001 P 
2004 L 
2005 P 
Iraq 
2005 L 
Kazakhstan 
1995 L 
1999 P 
2004 L 
2005 P 
Kenya 
1992 C 
1997 C 
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Table 4.1. (Continued) 
Korea, Rep. 
1978 L 
1981 L 
1985 L 
1987 L 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
1995 P 
2000 P 
Lebanon 
2005 L 
Lesotho 
1993 L 
1998 L 
2002 L 
Liberia 
1985 C 
1997 C 
2005 C 
Madagascar 
1992 P 
Malaysia 
1974 L 
1978 L 
1982 L 
1986 L 
1990 L 
1999 L 
2004 L 
Mauritania 
1992 C 
1996 L 
1997 P 
2001 L 
2003 P 
2006 L 
Mexico 
1976 L 
1979 L 
1982 C 
1985 L 
1988 C 
1991 L 
1994 C 
1997 L 
Morocco 
 1984 L 
1993 L 
1997 L 
2002 L 
Mozambique 
1994 C 
1999 C 
2004 C 
Namibia 
1994 C 
1999 C 
2004 C 
Nicaragua 
1974 P 
Niger 
1996 C 
1999 C 
Nigeria 
1983 C 
Pakistan 
1977 L 
2002 L 
Panama 
1984 C 
Paraguay 
1978 C 
1983 C 
1988 C 
Peru 
1990 C 
1995 C 
2000 C 
Philippines 
1978 L 
1981 P 
1984 L 
Russia 
1991 P 
1993 L 
1995 L 
1996 P 
1999 L 
2000 P 
2003 L 
2004 P 
Rwanda 
2003 C 
Senegal 
1978 C 
1983 C 
1988 C 
1993 C 
1998 L 
Serbia 
1992 L 
1992 L 
1996 L 
Sierra Leone 
1977 
Singapore 
1976 L 
1980 L 
1984 L 
1988 L 
1991 L 
1997 L 
2001 L 
2006 L 
South Africa 
1974 L 
1975 L 
1977 L 
1981 L 
1984 L 
1987 L 
1989 L 
1994 L 
1999 L 
2004 L 
Sri Lanka 
1977 L 
1982 P 
1988 P 
Sudan 
2000 P 
Taiwan 
1989 L 
1992 L 
1995 L 
Tajikistan 
1991 P 
1994 P 
1999 P 
2000 L 
2006 P 
Tanzania 
1995 C 
2000 C 
2005 C 
Thailand 
1976 L 
Togo 
1993 P 
1994 L 
1998 P 
2002 L 
2003 P 
2005 P 
Tunisia 
1979 L 
1981 L 
1986 L 
1989 L 
1994 L 
1999 C 
2004 L 
Uganda 
2006 C 
Uruguay 
1984 C 
Uzbekistan 
1991 P 
Yemen, Rep. 
1993 L 
1997 L 
1999 P 
2003 L 
2006 P 
Zambia 
1991 C 
1996 C 
2001 C 
2006 C 
Zimbabwe 
1974 L 
1977 L 
1979 L 
1980 L 
1985 L 
1990 C 
1995 L 
1996 P 
2000 L 
2002 P 
2005 L 
P = Presidential election, L = Legislative election, C = Concurrent elections within a year 
Note: The total number of elections does not add up to 381, as some countries (i.e. Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, South Africa) organise multiple elections for the same office. 
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Of these elections, 149 are presidential and 231 parliamentary. Some 48.3 per cent of 
the cases are from Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Eastern Europe and Latin America 
with 14.2 and 12.3 per cent respectively. The distribution of cases in time clearly mir-
rors the progress of the third wave of democratisation: while only 11.3 per cent of the 
elections were held in the 1970s, this number rises to 20.2 per cent in the next decade 
and peaks at 39.6 per cent in the 1990s before dropping to 28.8 per cent in the 2000s. 
4.1.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, electoral competitiveness, was conceptualised in chapter two as 
variation in electoral outcomes caused by shifting voting patterns (Strom 1989, 285). 
Although scholars have suggested several competing measures for this phenomenon 
(compare Aistrup 2004; Bond 1983; Foley and Steedly 1980; Patterson and Caldeira 
1984; Sartori 1976), it is here operationalised as margins of victory. For Strom (1989, 
285–287) and Schedler (2008, 11), electoral closeness is the most intuitive and useful 
measure across different electoral systems. Lindberg (2006, 39–40) and Bogaards 
(2000, 165) point in turn to the fact that this measure outperforms its most serious ri-
vals, the Laakso-Taagepera (1979) index of the effective number of parties and the ratio 
of votes, which both suffer from mathematical problems that render the measures unre-
liable (see also Dunleavy and Boucek 2003). Not surprisingly, margins of victory is thus 
the most frequently employed indicator of competitiveness in the literature on electoral 
authoritarianism (e.g. Greene 2010; Roessler and Howard 2008; Schedler 2009b). 
Following these approaches, the competitiveness of presidential elections is meas-
ured as the difference in vote shares between the winner and the runner-up as a percent-
age of total valid votes in the first round. Conversely, the competitiveness of legislative 
elections is quantified as the difference in seat shares between the largest and the second 
largest party in per cents. These measures are then combined in order to form the de-
pendent variable Margin of victory. As can be seen from Figure 4.1, which displays the 
margins of victory in national-level elections for selected countries, the new variable 
varies between 0 and 100 per cent, and is calculated using data from the election data 
handbooks of Nohlen et al. (2005a, 2005b; 2001a, 2001b; 2000; 2010), complemented 
for newer election-years with data from the IFES Election guide (2011), the African 
elections database (2011) and the Inter-parliamentary Union (Various years). 
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Figure 4.1. Margins of victory for selected countries, 1974-2006 
 
On an explanatory note, focusing only on the first round of presidential elections is 
motivated by concerns of validity. As Lindberg (2006, 39–40) explains, the first round 
tends to be more reflective of the actual level of competitiveness in two-round electoral 
systems. Moreover, this procedure renders the results compatible with the outcomes of 
presidential elections that require only a simple majority. The availability of data in turn 
explains why the share of seats as opposed to the share of votes is utilised with regard to 
legislative elections. Not only are vote shares often missing; there is, furthermore, rea-
son to believe that even when these figures are reported, they tend to be unreliable due 
to irregularities and problems with counting and voter registration. Seat shares are con-
sequently expected to yield a more accurate picture of the actual level of competitive-
ness (Lindberg 2006, 41). 
4.1.2. Independent variables 
The first hypothesis concerning voter behaviour and its consequences for the margins of 
victory states that voters cast their ballot for the dictator if they agree with his economic 
policies. In her book, Magaloni (2008, chapter 6) probes this relationship with the help 
of survey data, but for known reasons, this course of action is not open to me. Because I 
thus lack the means by which to explore whether the voters agree with the ideological 
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standpoints of the ruling party at the micro-level, I instead rely on two aggregate-level 
proxy indicators. 
As Powell and Whitten (1993, 404) discuss, it is well known that the ideological 
stances of right- and leftwing parties tend to translate into diverging economic policies. 
Rightist parties are, for instance, known to be more concerned with inflation than leftist 
parties, which in turn prioritise unemployment (see also Lijphart 1984). Moreover, these 
approaches have tended to attract different political clienteles, with rural electorates 
typically favouring right-leaning parties and the urban working-class constituting the 
traditional stronghold of left-leaning parties (Powell and Whitten 1993, 404). 
These patterns enable me to test the impact of the voters’ ideological affiliations on 
electoral competitiveness, for the purpose of which two indicators are created. The first 
variable, Government identity, is an ordinal measure from the Database of Political In-
stitutions (Beck et al. 2001) that I complement using data from Keesing’s Political par-
ties of the world (Day and Degenhardt Various years) and gauges the ideological orien-
tation of the ruling party with the help of three categories – right, centre and left. The 
second variable, Urban population, measures the proportion of people residing in urban 
areas as a percentage of the total population, and is derived from the World Bank’s 
(2011) World Development Indicators. I then allow Government identity to interact with 
Urban Population by transforming the former into two indicator (dummy) variables – 
Government identity right and Government identity left – which are multiplied in turn 
with the latter variable. The guiding assumption here is that right-wing parties win by 
greater margins than left-wing parties if the electorate is predominantly rural, whereas 
left-wing parties are expected to benefit more from an urban electorate than their right-
wing counterparts.
31
 
The first hypothesis further posits that increasing ethnic fractionalisation may be 
linked to smaller margins of victory as the number of competing preferences increases. 
The standard measure for ethnicity in the literature on comparative politics has long 
been the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (EFL). However, as this index is 
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 Because Urban Population will also be used to test the fourth hypothesis, it appears ill-advised to con-
struct the interaction variables using some other indicator that, for example, builds upon the distribution 
of labour as this would result in severe multicollinearity, viz. correlation between the independent vari-
ables that may undermine statistical power and bias the parameters of the model (e.g. Graham 2003). 
Another reason for not using a variable that measures employment in the agricultural or industrial sector 
is that the ratio of available data would be extremely low: on average, only some 27 per cent of the coun-
try years in my analysis would be covered. 
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based on the Atlas Narodov Mira originally compiled by Soviet ethnographers in 1964, 
the data are not only out-dated, but also display severe coding inaccuracies (Fearon 
2003). Furthermore, the Herfindahl concentration index that is used to calculate the de-
gree of fractionalisation has often been accused of insensitivity (Posner 2004). Even 
though newer contributions have sought to remedy some of these flaws (e.g. Alesina et 
al. 2003; Fearon 2003), these alternatives are not well suited for my research design as 
they continue to utilise the Herfindahl index and employ only cross-sectional data, that 
is, data that have been collected from one single year. 
Fortunately, Ellingsen (2000) offers raw data on the ethnic composition of all the 
countries relevant for my study. The data are collected from multiple points in time dur-
ing the interval 1945–1993 using the Handbook of Nations, Britannica Book of the 
Year, and the Demographic Yearbook and have been interpolated for missing years, 
thus allowing me to circumvent the above-mentioned problems. Following Ellingsen 
(ibid.) and Lee et al. (2004), I define an ethnic group as being based on “ascriptive dif-
ferences” that both the members of the group as well as outsiders regard as being rele-
vant to its identity, and measure ethnic pluralism in two ways.
32
 Ethnic first measures 
the size of the largest ethnic group as a percentage of the total population, and is ex-
pected to be positively associated with the margins of victory, not least because the rul-
ing government is typically associated with the largest ethnicity (Greene 2010, 816). 
Conversely, Ethnic groups captures a second dimension of ethnicity by gauging the 
number of ethnic groups that make up at least five per cent of the total population, and 
is in turn expected to be negatively associated with the margin of victory. 
ln(GDP) is in turn included to gauge the impact of wealth on electoral competitive-
ness. This variable measures a nation’s real gross domestic product per capita (in con-
stant 2005 international dollars) using data from the Penn World Table 7.0 Chain Series 
(Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011). I transform the variable into the natural logarithm 
in order to take into account the possibility that its effect is not constant at all levels. 
Although GDP per capita is the standard measure for development in comparative poli-
tics, it can be criticised on the grounds that it reveals little about how the wealth is dis-
tributed among the citizens and is thus less than optimal for gauging heterogeneity. It 
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 Ellingsen (2000) and Lee et al. (2004) utilise a third dimension, namely the size of the second largest 
ethnic group as a percentage of the total population. However, due to high correlations between the dif-
ferent measures of ethnicity and ensuing problems of multicollinearity, I choose to omit this dimension. 
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may consequently be expected to yield biased inferences in the case of countries where 
GDP is high, but the wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small elite. In my research 
design, GDP per capita is nevertheless preferable to the alternative – the GINI inequal-
ity index – seeing how it is a virtual impossibility to attain data for the latter for but a 
fraction of the period covered by my analysis. In line with the second hypothesis, higher 
levels of development are by increasing socio-economic heterogeneity expected to be 
related to smaller margins of victory. 
Hypothesis number three deals with the effects that the state of the economy has on 
electoral competitiveness. Pertaining to this point, Magaloni (2008) assumes the voters 
to form their judgements on the basis of three components, namely prior knowledge, the 
current state of the economy and the campaign promises of the respective parties. In 
doing so, the voters may obviously pay attention to several different aspects of the 
economy, but I have – following Magaloni and for the sake of parsimony – decided to 
focus solely on economic growth.
33
 
Concerning the operationalisation of these three components, the last one clearly 
poses the same predicament for me as for Magaloni (ibid., 204–205): because my data 
do not allow me to test the impact of campaign promises, this aspect is dropped from 
the analysis. With regard to the first two components, the unavailability of survey data 
once more hinders me from using Magaloni’s original measures. While Magaloni (ibid., 
chapter 7) gauges prior knowledge by calculating an average of the economic growth 
each survey respondent has experienced during his or her politically active life and 
measures the current state of the economy with the help of the respondents’ individual 
assessments (see also Choi 2007), I am compelled to rely on aggregate-level proxies. 
Since no data on growth rates with which to measure the current state of the econ-
omy are available on a monthly basis, it becomes sensible to combine the first two 
components into one single variable, this being commonly done in the literature on eco-
nomic voting by measuring economic change in the year preceding the elections 
(Greene 2010). A one-year-lag is, however, clearly too short to capture Magaloni’s no-
tion of how the voters’ prior knowledge influences their vote choice. Fortunately, 
Reuter and Gandhi (2011) propose some alternative measures for this, the first of which 
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 If included into the baseline model as an alternative measure, the annual rate of inflation, measured as 
the GDP deflator in percentages and lagged by one year using data from the World Bank’s (2011) World 
Development Indicators, had a negative effect on the margin of victory as predicted. The variable failed, 
however, to reach statistical significance. 
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gauges the average growth rate over the life of each regime. As this averaging would in 
my analysis result in highly uneven lags ranging between 1 and 68 years, while in many 
cases also reducing the variance of the indicator considerably, the second alternative 
focusing on the election cycle seems more appealing. Economic growth thus measures 
the average growth in GDP per capita in percentages using data from the World Bank’s 
(2011) World Development Indicators during a period that begins in the year of the pre-
vious election and ends in the year prior to the relevant election. If no previous election 
has been held, the period begins five years before the election at hand (Reuter and Gan-
dhi 2011, 93). Following Magaloni, higher growth rates are expected to be related to 
higher margins of victory as they serve to cancel out the impact of voter heterogeneity. 
Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min. Max. N 
Margin of victory 46.69 29.52 0 100 381 
Government identity 2.12 0.89 1 3 378 
Ethnic first 71.07 21.44 21 100 370 
Ethnic groups 2.71 1.48 1 8 354 
ln(GDP) 7.74 1.04 5.13 10.71 375 
Economic growth 3.14 6.63 -22.6 41.11 371 
Urban population 43.67 19.03 7.8 100 378 
Repression 4.57 1.07 2 7 381 
Government consumption 14.92 6.72 3 42 354 
Fraud 0.56 0.49 0 1 372 
Media bias 0.37 0.48 0 1 332 
Previous election 0.02 0.32 -72.66 69.30 312 
Boycott 0.24 0.43 0 1 378 
Protest 0.21 0.41 0 1 364 
Opposition fragmentation 0.53 0.32 0 1 362 
Aid 48.21 52.74 -1.00 272.48 350 
Foreign direct investment 2.83 7.28 -39.73 53.56 333 
Singapore and Malaysia 0.03 0.19 0 1 381 
Note: See text for definition of variables and sources used. 
The already described variable Urban population is also utilised on its own to test 
the fourth hypothesis, which suggests that there is a systematic relationship between 
urbanisation and competitiveness. The assumption here is that increasing urbanisation 
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entails increasing heterogeneity, and it hence has a negative impact on the margin of 
victory. 
Lastly in order to measure the effect of repression, I make use of the Freedom House 
(2011) civil liberties scale (CL). Following the original coding, Repression constitutes 
an ordinal level scale consisting of seven categories with larger values indicating in-
creasing coercion and measures four areas of liberties, namely freedom of expression 
and belief; associational and organisational rights; rule of law; as well as personal 
autonomy and individual rights. I lag the variable by one year in order to avoid issues of 
endogeneity, that is, reversed causality between the dependent and the independent 
variable. Although the CL index as a part of the composite Freedom House index has 
already been shown to be suffering from certain methodological drawbacks (see section 
4.1.1.), its usage is recommended by the fact that it is the only measure that offers a 
sufficient coverage of countries in both time and space (compare Cingranelli and Rich-
ards 2010). The fifth hypothesis assumes that the margin of victory will increase as the 
level of repression increases as repression, too, mitigates the effect of heterogeneity. 
Descriptive statistics for Repression as well as all the other variables are displayed in 
Table 4.2. 
4.1.1. Control variables 
Besides testing the effect of voter heterogeneity, I add several control variables that aim 
at taking into account the actions of the dictator and the opposition, as well as the im-
pact of factors that are external to the regime. To cover the role of the dictator, I intro-
duce four variables. To start with, I include an indicator for the incumbent autocrat’s 
resource monopoly, Government consumption. As Greene (2010, 814) notes, this factor 
is not easily captured in one single measure, and my variable must thus be considered a 
rather crude proxy.
34
 As such, it measures general government final consumption in-
cluding expenditures for purchases, services and wages as a percentage of GDP using 
data from the World Bank’s (2011) World Development Indicators. The assumption is 
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 Drawing on the vast literature on rentier states (e.g. Ross 2001), an alternative indicator, Rents, was 
also included to measure oil rents as a percentage of GDP using data from the World Bank’s (2011) 
World Development Indicators under the assumption that higher rent incomes would help the dictator to 
maintain higher margins of victory. This variable failed to reach standard levels of statistical significance. 
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that the more a government can afford to consume on different forms of patronage, the 
larger the margin of victory. 
Next, I include two dichotomous variables from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2010). 
The first one, Fraud, taps the incumbent’s manipulative practices and takes on the value 
1 if there are reported concerns about the integrity of the upcoming elections before 
election day, 0 otherwise. Media bias is in turn intended to control for the incumbent’s 
grip of the media, and is coded 1 if the media is reportedly biased in favour of the ruling 
incumbent or when the media is totally controlled by the government, 0 otherwise. 
Since electoral fraud and restrictions on the freedom of the media are used to fix the 
elections in favour of the dictator, both are expected to have a positive impact on the 
margin of victory. 
Lastly, Previous election is intended to proxy the dictator’s perceived electoral vul-
nerability. Modifying a measure developed by Reuter and Gandhi (2011), the variable 
tracks changes in the vote share of the incumbent (party) in percentages since the previ-
ous election. If the dictator, for instance, wins 95 per cent of the vote at time t and 80 
per cent at time t + 1, the change at the latter time is 95–80 = 15.35 Following Reuter 
and Gandhi’s coding, the first elections after single-party rule receive a value of 100, 
whereas the first elections after independence use the vote share of the incumbent 
(party) in elections for territorial or colonial assemblies. If no prior presidential elec-
tions exist, the measure uses the vote share of the incumbent’s party in the previous leg-
islative elections, and vice versa. Data for this variable are culled from Nohlen et al. 
(2005a, 2005b; 2001a, 2001b; 2000; 2010), the IFES Election guide (2011), the African 
elections database (2011) and the Inter-parliamentary Union (Various years). As posi-
tive values signify a net loss in votes and thus constitute a sign of vulnerability on the 
part of the dictator, Previous election should stand in a negative relationship to the mar-
gin of victory. 
The behaviour of the opposition is in turn modelled with the help of three variables. 
The dichotomous indicator Boycott is coded 1 if at least one of the opposition parties 
boycotted the elections, 0 otherwise, and uses data from the NELDA dataset (Hyde and 
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  euter and Gandhi (2011) actually measure change in the incumbent’s electoral fortunes over the two 
previous elections. While this practice would in theory yield a much more comprehensive picture of the 
dictator’s electoral invincibility and vulnerability, it would in practice reduce the number of observations 
radically from 290 to 196. Substituting Previous election with the more rigorous variant in the regression 
analysis (results not shown) yields substantially highly similar results. 
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Marinov 2010). As discussed earlier, opposition boycotts may have a significant impact 
on the degree of competitiveness although the factor is not explicitly covered by 
Magaloni’s argument. Thus, controlling for this element in the empirical analysis seems 
advisable, even at the risk of it constituting something of an ad hoc insert from the theo-
retical point of view. In this vein, it should be noted that the upcoming analysis only 
takes into account the short-term effects of boycotts, i.e. their consequences for the most 
proximate election, but makes no assumptions about their long-term effects on the elec-
toral fortunes of the opposition. Boycotts are in this line assumed to have a positive im-
pact on the margin of victory. 
Similarly, the binary variable Protest receives a value of 1 if the government’s han-
dling of the elections leads to post-electoral protests, 0 otherwise, and is derived from 
NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2010). Following Magaloni’s (2008) theory and to avoid 
endogeneity, the variable is lagged by one election cycle – the elections at time t will in 
other words be affected by an eventual protest at time t - 1. Contrary to the theory that 
delimits the tactic to a very narrowly defined situation, however, the variable also in-
cludes protests that do not involve allegations of electoral fraud, since adherence to this 
criterion would have reduced the number of cases so radically as to render a meaningful 
statistical inquiry futile.
36
 Unfortunately, this change does little to alleviate the inherent 
causal ambivalence of this tactic in Magaloni’s theory, and the inclusion of Protest in 
the analysis must consequently be viewed as an explorative act since its impact on the 
margin of victory can come to work in either direction. 
In order to tap into the coordination dilemmas of the opposition, then, I include the 
proxy variable Opposition fragmentation which aims at measuring the unity of the op-
position parties. Following Reuter and Gandhi (2011), I measure fragmentation by di-
viding the vote share (in presidential elections) or seat share (in legislative elections) of 
the largest opposition party (    by the total sum of all opposition parties (  ),       . 
The measure thus varies between 0 and 1, with the latter value indicating a unified op-
position. The variable is calculated using data from Nohlen et al. (2005a, 2005b; 2001a, 
2001b; 2000; 2010), the IFES Election guide (2011), the African elections database 
(2011), as well as the Inter-parliamentary Union (Various years). A unified opposition 
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 Indeed, when using data from NELDA (Hyde and Marino 2010), only 52 protests in my data involve 
such allegations and in all but one of these it can be assumed that electoral fraud was common knowledge 
amongst the voters. 
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is likely to ease co-ordination with the electorate, and is therefore expected to have a 
negative impact on the margin of victory. 
The effect of external factors is in turn measured using two variables. The first one, 
Aid, gauges the percentage change in net official development aid received by a regime 
as a percentage of gross national investment in the two years before the election. Data 
for this variable come from the World Bank’s (2011) World Development Indicators, 
and since dependency on foreign aid is in line with Magaloni’s argument thought to 
decrease the incumbent’s incentives to commit fraud and oppress the opposition, the 
variable is expected to be negatively associated with the margin of victory. 
In a similar vein, I also probe the effect of a regime’s average net inflow of foreign 
direct investments as a percentage of GDP in the two years prior to the election at hand. 
Data for Foreign direct investment come from the World Bank’s (2011) World Devel-
opment Indicators, and since many investors can be expected to value political stability 
over democracy, FDI can be looked upon as an additional source of revenue for the dic-
tator. The variable is consequently expected to have a positive impact on the margin of 
victory. 
Finally, I add a dummy variable Singapore and Malaysia in order to control for these 
two countries in the analysis, as post-estimation tests reveal both to be outliers in terms 
of urbanisation and economic development. 
4.2. Method and models 
Since our interest lies in establishing the independent as well as combined effects of a 
number of explanatory variables on the dependent variable, while at the same time con-
trolling for several intervening variables, a multiple regression analysis is clearly the 
method of choice. As has already been mentioned, however, the subsequent analysis 
employs time-series cross-sectional data (hereafter TSCS), also known as longitudinal 
data, which feature “repeated observations on fixed units” (Beck and Katz 1995, 634), 
typically a set of countries, N, that are observed over a number of years, T. This requires 
that the effects of voter heterogeneity on competitiveness be explored using a regression 
model that takes into account both the spatial and temporal dimension of the data. Since 
a basic linear multiple regression model only acknowledges the former, one may instead 
utilise a generic pooled multiple regression model (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 699): 
         
                                            (4.1) 
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where     is a scalar dependent variable,   the intercept,      a     vector of inde-
pendent variables and     a scalar composite disturbance term, with i and t indexing 
country and time respectively. 
Although TSCS data render the model slightly more complicated, employing this 
type of data is not without its benefits as they have in fact been shown to offer many 
advantages over purely cross-sectional or time-series data, and are as a result now 
commonly used throughout the field of comparative politics. For example, TSCS data 
help to increase the number of observations by multiplying N with T, producing in this 
fashion greater statistical leverage on the grounds of the subsequent increase in the de-
grees of freedom. On the other hand, they also serve to remedy the problem of unob-
served variables by enabling the scholar to incorporate time invariant factors as well as 
the interaction of time and space into the analysis (Beck and Katz 2011, 332; Hsiao 
2004, 3–8; Lauth, Pickel, and Pickel 2009, 113–115; Podestà 2002, 7–8; Worrall and 
Pratt 2004, 36). 
Yet the pooled regression model in equation (4.1) also poses challenges, especially 
with regard to estimating the unknown parameters β. As is well known, the most com-
monly used estimator of linear regression models is ordinary least squares (OLS) 
(Cohen et al. 2003, 124). OLS quite simply implies fitting the optimal regression line to 
the data by minimising the sum of squared residuals (that is, the difference between the 
predicted and the observed values) and constitutes an unbiased, consistent and optimal – 
or best linear unbiased (BLUE) – estimator as long as the basic Gauss-Markov assump-
tions hold (Wooldridge 2009, 32, chapter 5).
37
 With regard to being unbiased and con-
sistent, these assumptions include that the independent variables are exogenous, i.e. that 
none of them are correlated with the error term, and that they display no perfect multi-
collinearity with one another. With regard to being optimal, OLS assumes the errors to 
be independent and identically distributed (iid).38 This requires homoscedasticity, viz. 
that the variance of the error term is constant across all values of  , as well as independ-
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 An unbiased estimator will yield estimates of the regression coefficients from a given sample that on 
average equal the true value in the population. A consistent estimator in turn has a sample distribution 
which approaches the true value of the estimate as the sample size approaches the infinite. Finally, an 
optimal or efficient estimator minimises the amount of variation around the true value of the estimate as 
measured in standard errors (Allison 1999, 120; Cohen et al. 2003, 124). 
38
 The errors are in other words assumed to be spherical, that is (Beck 2001, 275): 
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ent error processes, that is to say, that the errors are uncorrelated with one another 
(Cohen et al. 2003, chapter 4.3; Wooldridge 2009, chapter 3, 170). 
If these criteria are violated, OLS runs the risk of turning biased, inconsistent and in-
efficient, while also suffering from incorrect standard errors, which reduces our ability 
to calculate confidence intervals and carry out statistical tests (Cohen et al. 2003, 119–
120). Although these repercussions must be considered serious, issues in modelling 
TSCS data have received surprisingly little attention in the field of electoral authoritari-
anism so far (but see Greene 2010; Magaloni 2008; Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Teorell 
and Hadenius 2009). This raises some concerns about the robustness of earlier findings, 
as there is reason to believe that these conditions do not hold when working with longi-
tudinal data that tend to undermine these assumptions in at least four distinct ways 
(Beck and Katz 1995, 636; Podestà 2002, 10–12; Worrall and Pratt 2004, 36–41): 
First, TSCS data may cause the variance of the error processes to vary across units, 
giving rise to heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity may arise, for instance, when the 
scale of the dependent variable differs across countries so that the margins of victory 
vary more, say, in Haiti than in Malaysia. 
Second, error processes tend to be correlated across units, which generates contem-
poraneous correlation between the errors for country i and country j at time t. The er-
rors for the Eastern European and Euro-Asian CIS countries might thus be expected to 
correlate with one another at any given point in time, although they are likely to remain 
independent of those for the geographically more distant Bolivia or Fiji. 
Third, the errors are often correlated over time within units, which results in serial 
correlation. Thus, the degree of electoral competitiveness in, say, Tanzania in the 1990s 
can in part be used to explain the country’s degree of competitiveness in the 2000s. 
Fourth, there may be some time- and/or unit-constant factors – for example, legacies 
of political culture – that affect the outcome of interest in a given unit, but which have 
not been explicitly modelled. If the ensuing unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled 
for, the consequence is a form of omitted variable bias, which may render OLS incon-
sistent (see also Wooldridge 2002, chapter 10). 
To make matters more complicated still, many of the “standard” approaches that 
have been developed to tackle these complications are by default ruled out because of 
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the panel-like nature of my data.
39
 Accordingly, to use OLS with panel-corrected stan-
dard errors (PCSE) as proposed by Beck and Katz (1995) is unadvisable, as their accu-
racy crucially hinges on the number of observations per unit, and my panel contains an 
average of only 4.5 elections per country. Similarly, adding a lagged dependent variable 
to correct for serial correlation appears inappropriate (Beck and Katz 2011), since my 
panel is also extremely unbalanced, with many countries having experienced only a few 
electoral events occurring at very irregular intervals. This renders the lagged variable a-
theoretical as it assumes the impact of the regressors on the dependent variable to de-
cline geometrically over time, instead of only affecting the most proximate election 
(Golder 2006, 38; see also Beck 2001, 274). Finally, the data even render the abandon-
ment of OLS in favour of certain alternative estimators problematic. In this vein, a 
population-averaged model such as the generalised estimating equation (GEE) approach 
risks producing inconsistent estimates of β because the panel features observations that 
are “missing at random” (MA ) as opposed to “missing completely at random” 
(MCAR) (Zorn 2001).
40
 
Within these limits, earlier studies using electoral TSCS data with a country-to-year-
ratio similar to mine have focused exclusively on correcting the standard errors by using 
country-clustered robust standard errors (i.e. Golder 2006; Reuter and Gandhi 2011). 
This simple approach is moderately attractive: although a Lagram-Multiplier test as 
described by Wooldridge (2002, 282–283) reveals no need to take serial correlation into 
consideration (p = .79), the robust standard errors would control for the presence of het-
eroscedasticity detected in the data by a modified Wald’s test (p < .001).41 This ap-
                                                   
39
 Beck (2001, 273–274) makes a distinction between TSCS data and panel data with the former consist-
ing of fixed units and a large T, while the latter constitutes a sample with a small T-to-N-ratio. In this 
view, my data are of a mixed breed as they constitute the population of competitive authoritarian elections 
but at the same time have an on-average small T in comparison to N. 
40
 One of the most pressing problems with longitudinal data is the question of what to do with missing 
data. The standard solution to this dilemma – list-wise deletion, where the whole unit is omitted from the 
analysis if it displays a missing value on at least one of the variables – has been criticised on the grounds 
that it leads to a truncated sample (Beck and Katz 2011, 333). A more sophisticated alternative is offered 
by multiple imputation, which builds upon “extract[ing] relevant information from the observed portions 
of a data set via a statistical model, to impute multiple (around five) values for each missing cell, and to 
use these to construct multiple ‘completed’ data sets” (Honaker and King 2010, 561). However, although 
several advanced programmes now enable scholars to make use of this approach (see e.g. ibid.), the task 
of combining and analysing the resulting multiple datasets is still subject to considerable practical diffi-
culties. Due to these complications, I have decided against multiple imputation even though this reduces 
the number of observations. 
41
 Here, three first-order error processes were considered, as these typically suffice for annual data (Beck 
and Katz 2011, 337). While a Lagram-Multiplier test revealed no first-order autoregression (AR1), the 
second approach – the finite distributed lag (FDL) model – which assumes that “the impact of x sets in 
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proach is incapable of tackling contemporaneous correlation, however, although this is 
not likely to be much of a problem in my data. As Baltagi (2005) notes, contemporane-
ous correlation tends to be a problem in balanced macro panels, that is, when many 
countries organise elections in the same year. Unfortunately, none of the standard tests 
for cross-sectional dependence – e.g. Breusch and Pagan’s (1980) Lagrange multiplier 
test of independence and Pesaran’s (2004) cross-sectional dependence test – can be car-
ried out to affirm this assumption because my panel is so highly unbalanced. 
While correcting for the standard errors is certainly of pivotal importance, it implies 
a lack of attention paid to the issue of unobserved heterogeneity that is concerning, see-
ing how this matter has direct consequences for the choice of estimator. Thinking back 
to equation (4.1), a pooled OLS (POLS) model clearly harbours the assumption that all 
countries are homogeneous as concerns the factors affecting the dependent variable, 
which is revealed by the inclusion of the common intercept  . This may well be an un-
realistic assumption; indeed, by carrying out an incremental F-test, the null-hypothesis 
of unit homogeneity in the cross-section dimension is clearly rejected (p < .001). As a 
subsequent F-test fails to reveal similar heterogeneity in the temporal dimension (p = 
.75), the ensuing omitted variable bias may be rectified by taking the unobserved het-
erogeneity into account in a one-way individual-specific effects model, which can, build-
ing upon the POLS model from equation (4.1), be expressed in matrix notation as 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 700): 
          
                                (4.2) 
where    represent the individual effects and     an idiosyncratic error. Depending upon 
the relationship between    and the observed regressors, the model can be refined fur-
ther and an estimator be chosen accordingly. As concerns the choice of model, two al-
ternatives present themselves. If    are assumed to be correlated with    , a fixed effects 
(FE) model that treats the individual effects as unit-specific intercepts is called for – this 
amounts to estimating equation (4.2). Conversely, if    are assumed to be uncorrelated 
with    , one ought to chose a random effects (RE) model which uses a random intercept 
coefficient   and, in line with the POLS model in equation (4.1), places the individual 
                                                                                                                                                     
over two (or a few) periods but then dissipates completely” (ibid., 334) is de facto applied in the analysis 
as some of the independent variables are indeed assumed to function with a lag. The third alternative – a 
lagged dependent variable – has already been shown to be inappropriate for my research design (ibid.; see 
also Golder 2006, 38). 
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effects in the composite error,           , and yields the following equation (ibid., 
734): 
         
                                (4.3) 
Obviously, the choice between these two models is far from trivial. If the true model 
is indeed a FE model, a fixed effects estimator (within, first differences) must be used 
for robustness, as both OLS and the random effects estimator – feasible generalised 
least squares (FGLS) – will be inconsistent and biased due to the ensuing correlation 
between the regressors and the error term. If the true model is a RE model, both the 
fixed and random effects estimators as well as OLS will be consistent and unbiased; 
however, because the inclusion of the time-invariant    in the composite error will in 
fact end up generating serial correlation for a given country at time t and s, FGLS will 
be the most efficient estimator under the assumption that both    and     are iid with the 
respective distributions      
   and      
  , although the gain when compared to OLS 
need not be great (ibid., 700; Wooldridge 2002, 251–252).42 
The central task is thus to establish whether or not fixed effects belong in the model. 
For this purpose, a Hausman test (Hausman 1978) is usually carried out under the null 
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, which in this 
instance yields a clearly non-significant result (p = .28). A problem with the test in its 
original formulation is, however, that it assumes RE to be fully efficient under   . This 
is obviously not the case when    or     are non-iid (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 718–
719; Wooldridge 2002, 288–291). With this in mind, I instead perform two panel-robust 
variants of the test as proposed by Wooldridge (ibid.) and Hoechle (2007) that are capa-
ble of dealing with non-spherical errors. Both tests yield essentially the same result, 
rejecting fixed effects in favour of random effects at the 5% level (p = .08 and p = .14). 
This is a fortunate finding, for although RE models are often estimated with fixed ef-
fects estimators because their robustness is thought to make them “a more convincing 
tool for estimating ceteris paribus effects” (Wooldridge 2009, 493), they entail a serious 
loss of efficiency and are likely to yield imprecise estimates for variables that change 
slowly over time as these are conflated and eliminated with the time-invariant    (Cam-
eron and Trivedi 2005, 714–715; Wooldridge 2002, 286, 2009, 493). 
                                                   
42
 On a clarifying note, Wooldridge’s (2002) LM test mentioned earlier only tests for serial correlation in 
the idiosyncratic error term    . The serial correlation here pertains to correlation between     and    . 
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As a Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test that probes the presence of ran-
dom effects further supports the usage of RE over a simple POLS in terms of efficiency 
(p < .001), the following baseline random effects regression model could be used: 
                                                                
                                                       
                                                                
                                  (4.4) 
On closer inspection, it becomes clear that this model is in need of some modifica-
tion. As is common with quantitative studies of societal development, the indicators 
used to measure the various dimensions of this phenomenon tend to be inter-correlated. 
Although this does not bias the investigation altogether – remember that in order to be 
unbiased, OLS and FGLS only require that no perfect multicollinearity exists between 
the regressors – a high degree of multicollinearity does inflate the standard errors of the 
β coefficients. It will thus not only distort the statistical significance of the predictors 
and render them unpredictable by increasing the variance of their coefficients, but also 
reduce the overall explanatory power of the model (R
2
) (Cohen et al. 2003, 419). 
In the baseline model, multicollinearity may be a concern with regard to ln(GDP) 
and Urban population (mean VIF 2.15), as well as my two measures of ethnicity (mean 
VIF 2.63). I am somewhat reluctant to split up the two latter variables, as they are de-
signed to go together and in fact loose all statistical significance without the controlling 
effect of the other; furthermore, if included into the same model, their behaviour re-
mains constant across all models. Placing the first two into the same model does, on the 
other hand, seem to infuse the model with a considerable degree of unpredictability, 
which justifies their separation. I thus run two baseline models, Model 1: 
                                                                
                                                       
                                                   
                                  (4.5) 
and Model 2: 
                                                                 
                                                                 (4.6) 
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which I estimate using feasible generalised least squares (FGLS), while employing 
country-clustered robust standard errors to take into account the non-spherical error 
structure. Generalised least squares works in all brevity by exploiting the more complex 
      error covariance matrix, denoted as  , and by transforming the model into a 
form that is conducive to estimation using OLS.
43
 The procedure turns into feasible 
generalised least squares, however, because the true error covariance matrix always 
remains unknown up to a multiplicative constant, and the matrix used is therefore an 
estimate,  , that is calculated on the basis of the β estimates of OLS. The coefficients 
estimated by FGLS can thus be denoted as    and are produced according to the follow-
ing equation (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 81–82): 
            
    
  
             (4.5) 
Finally, it is worth noting that although using a random effects model may seem to 
violate the underlying logic of my inquiry – it inherently harbours the notion of the data 
constituting a representative random sample rather than a population of non-
exchangeable units – the inferences presented in the following would not have been 
significantly altered had I instead employed a fixed effects estimator (within estimator), 
with the obvious exception of the two quasi-time-invariant variables pertaining to eth-
nicity. The gained efficiency when using a RE model instead of a FE model does in 
other words not come at the expense of robustness. Having said this, let us now proceed 
to the actual analysis. 
  
                                                   
43
 In more exact parlance, GLS “transform[s] a system of equations where the error has nonscalar vari-
ance-covariance matrix into a system where the error vector has a scalar variance-covariance matrix” 
(Wooldridge 2002, 154). 
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5. Analysis 
This section presents and discusses the results from the random effects regression 
analysis that tests the impact of voter heterogeneity on electoral competitiveness in line 
with the six hypotheses formulated in chapter three. Following Magaloni’s (2008) the-
ory, the analysis simultaneously evaluates alternative explanations for the observed de-
gree of competitiveness by investigating the role of the dictator and the opposition, as 
well as the consequences of selected external factors. 
The results from the baseline models are presented in the first two columns in Table 
5.1, and are all-in-all quite encouraging – a systematic relationship indeed seems to ex-
ists between voter heterogeneity and the degree of competitiveness, with the independ-
ent variables being able to explain approximately a fifth of the observed variation in the 
margins of victory across and within countries (Model 1: R
2
 = .215; Model 2: R
2
 = 
.165).
44
 However, this optimism must immediately be qualified by pointing out that this 
conclusion only holds true of certain forms of heterogeneity, seeing how the results in 
fact offer somewhat mixed support for the individual hypotheses. As the behaviour of 
the independent variables proves to be fairly consistent across all subsequent models, 
though, two distinct patterns can be discussed. 
Looking at Table 5.1, the first main finding is that neither the affinity between the 
governing party’s and the electorate’s political views, nor the degree of urbanisation or 
the level of repression have a noticeable effect on the margins of victory in electoral 
autocracies. Indeed, the relevant variables consistently fall short of conventional levels 
of statistical significance, with the exception of Repression and the interaction variable 
consisting of the right-wing government dummy and urbanisation, which turn out to be 
significant at the .90 level in Models 1 and 3 respectively.
45
 Despite the indicators gen-
erally behaving as predicted, hypotheses H1a, H4 and H5 are in other words not sup-
ported by the outcome of the analysis. 
  
                                                   
44
 This interpretation of the goodness of fit (R
2
) is derived from the fact that the random effects estimator 
in fact produces a weighted average of the within and between estimators. 
45
 Because no theoretical assumptions were made with regard to the main effects of the dummy variables 
that gauge the political standing of the ruling party, the (insignificant) results for these indicators have 
been omitted from Table 5.1. 
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In spite of this outcome defying the theoretical expectations discussed earlier, it is 
not entirely out of line with Magaloni’s argument. As regards the role of the incumbent 
party’s economic policies, the results in fact conform well to Magaloni’s tentative 
hunch about the relative insignificance of the dictator’s ideological standpoints when 
explaining his electoral support – indeed, the voters seem in general to reason in terms 
of material concerns. Another interpretation is also possible, though. Since many of the 
countries in the analysis are characterised by instable and amorphous party systems, the 
result may also be reflective of the weak standing of political parties in these systems. 
When parties constitute little more than loose coalitions bound together, not by a com-
mon political ideology, but by mutual gain-seeking, the disillusioned voters are not 
likely to attach much importance to partisan labels or the contents of party manifestos. 
Similarly, the results for repression may be understood in terms of the arguably sub-
tle, but crucial distinction made earlier between the potential and actual use of force, 
and in this case, the insignificance of the latter may perhaps be explained by the suc-
cessful use of the former. The fact that urbanisation is found to be non-significant must 
be considered more puzzling, however, as both models at the same time deliver strong 
evidence in favour of hypotheses H1b, H2 and H3, including the argument made about 
the impact of increasing socio-economic development, which one would presume to 
have gone hand-in-hand with increasing urbanisation. 
The second main finding is in other words that the ethnic composition of the elector-
ate has a statistically significant effect on the degree of competitiveness alongside in-
creasing wealth (GDP per capita) and economic growth. The evidence is far from un-
equivocal in the case of ethnicity, however, for although both indicators are highly sig-
nificant, they also seem to warrant highly contradictious inferences about the conse-
quences of ethnic heterogeneity for the degree of competitiveness: while the size of the 
largest ethnic group seems to give a boost to the dictator’s vote share as predicted, so, 
too, does the overall number of ethnic groups. One way to enable a more substantive 
interpretation of these findings is to generate predictions using the mean effect of the 
respective variables. In this vein, the size of the largest ethnicity is predicted to inflate 
the dictator’s margin by almost 28 percentage points when growing from a fifth to four 
fifths of the population. On the other hand, the number of ethnic groups will in line with 
the prediction boost the autocrat’s vote share by some 38 percentage points as the num-
ber of ethnic groups rises from two to eight. 
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The fact that both ethnic concentration and ethnic dispersion consequently appear to 
be working in favour of the incumbent may in part be explained by the presence of mul-
ticollinearity in the model. However, because the number of ethnic groups is positively, 
albeit non-significantly, associated with the margin of victory even when no other indi-
cator for ethnicity is included in the model (results not shown), it is also possible that 
the indicator itself is invalid. Echoing the constructivist critique of how most measures 
of ethnicity are incapable of distinguishing between situations where ethnic origin con-
stitutes a politically salient identity and situations where it constitutes merely a latent 
identity (e.g. Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Laitin and Posner 2001), it is a distinct pos-
sibility that the discovered relationship between the number of ethnic groups and the 
degree of electoral competitiveness – no matter how strong and positive it may be – is, 
in fact, spurious. 
The impact of development on electoral competitiveness is also significant, even 
though its magnitude is considerably smaller: if GDP per capita increases by one per 
cent, the dictator’s vote share is in accordance with Model 2 expected to shrink by an 
average of 0.042 percentage points, ceteris paribus.
46
 In terms of predicted values, a 
country whose level of development roughly equals that of Zimbabwe in the 1970s with 
a GPD per capita rate of 308$, is thus expected to exhibit margins of victory on average 
14 percentage points higher than those of a country resembling Mexico in the same dec-
ade, with a much higher GDP per capita of 8824$. 
Even though this finding may be interpreted as a vindication of modernisation theory 
and its thesis of how increased wealth generates social diversity that in turn fosters 
competitiveness, it does not necessarily allow for too far-reaching conclusions since the 
measure is somewhat oblique as regards the exact nature of the discovered causal 
mechanism. The fact that ln(GDP) remains significant even when controlling for the 
impact of the dictator’s resource monopoly in Model 3 does, nevertheless, lend some 
credit to Magaloni’s proposal that accumulating wealth works by means of liberating 
the voters from the shackles of patronage. 
The positive and significant impact of Economic growth implies in turn that long-
term economic growth in part cancels out the consequences of voter heterogeneity since 
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 Because the model is one with random effects, interpreting the coefficients is slightly more complicated 
than in the case of an OLS regression in the sense that the coefficients in fact reflect the average effect of 
  over   when the former changes by one unit across time and between countries. 
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it induces the voters to support the incumbent at the polls, in the same vein as economic 
slumps are likely to erode his popularity. All else being equal, an average annual growth 
rate of 1% is thus expected to increase the autocrat’s vote share by approximately 0.6 
percentage points. What this means is that by moving from a country like Gabon, where 
the economy shrank by on average -0.21 percent annually in the early 2000s, to a coun-
try like its neighbour Equatorial Guinea, which at that time enjoyed an exceptionally 
strong average growth rate of 34.2 percent annually, the ruling incumbent’s vote share 
is predicted to increase by some 22 percentage points. 
This result is particularly interesting with regard to Magaloni’s argument insofar as 
substituting the indicator with a more conventional measure that tracks macro-economic 
change only in the year preceding the election at hand, motivates substantially similar 
inferences (results not shown), but the variable is statistically significant only in half the 
models and, even then, only at the .90 level of significance. Subsequently, this evidence 
strongly corroborates Magaloni’s view of the electorate repudiating economic myopia in 
favour of more long-term evaluations about the dictator’s ability to handle the economy. 
Finally, the dummy variable which is intended to control for the outlier-countries 
Singapore and Malaysia exhibits a strong, highly significant and positive effect on the 
margin of victory, reflecting the exceptionally strong electoral dominance of the ruling 
party especially in Singapore. As the extreme values both of these countries display 
with regard to GDP per capita and urbanisation represent rare cases rather than products 
of miss-coding, the decision to control for them in the analysis is not entirely undisputed 
from a methodological point of view, and leaving out Singapore and Malaysia indeed 
alters the findings somewhat. As can be seen from Table 5.2, which displays the results 
from Models 1 and 2 when no controls for outliers are included, the variables for both 
development and urbanisation now fall below conventional levels of statistical signifi-
cance, in addition to which the latter also displays the “wrong” sign. Repression also 
turns insignificant in Model 1, on top of which the overall goodness of fit (R
2
) drops 
rather markedly to some 10 per cent. However, since an omission of this controlling 
element does not significantly affect the behaviour of the other variables in these or any 
of the consequent models, making use of this perhaps less-than-best-practice only alters 
the inferences made about the impact of GPD per capita on electoral competitiveness. 
As concerns the choice of control, then, it should be stated that while the creation of a 
dummy variable emerges as a preferable alternative to simply eliminating these two 
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countries from the analysis, this second control method produces results substantially 
very similar to those presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2. Effect of voter heterogeneity on electoral competitiveness without control-
ling for Singapore and Malaysia 
 Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Government identity right  Urban population -0.35 
(0.29) 
 
Government identity left  Urban population -0.09 
(0.29) 
 
Ethnic first 0.43*** 
(0.17) 
0.46*** 
(0.17) 
Ethnic groups 5.92** 
(2.35) 
6.61*** 
(2.48) 
ln(GDP)  -2.14 
(2.71) 
Economic growth 0.64*** 
(0.19) 
0.65*** 
(0.22) 
Urban population 0.12 
(0.22) 
 
Repression 2.60 
(1.60) 
1.62 
(1.60) 
Constant -16.94 
(20.79) 
2.55 
(32.63) 
N 338 339 
R
2
 (overall) .135 .08 
* significant at the 90% confidence level; ** significant at the 95% confidence level; *** significant at 
the 99% confidence level. Two-tailed. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country). 
Moving on to the further specifications, the fact that I am using two baseline models 
due to multicollinearity effectively necessitates running Models 3 through 8 twice – 
once using Model 1 with the interaction variables and Urban population, and once us-
ing Model 2 with ln(GDP). As all the specifications yield practically the same results, 
however, only the results from regressions based on Model 2 are, in the interest of sav-
ing space, shown in Table 5.1. The coefficients and standard errors for the interaction 
variables and Urban population from the omitted parallel models are included in brack-
ets. 
The overall picture to emerge from this exercise is that the findings from Models 1 
and 2 are in fact quite robust in the face of alternative specifications. Model 3 – the dic-
tator model – tests the impact of the independent variables on competitiveness when 
controlling for the actions of the incumbent autocrat. Including these controls on aver-
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age strengthens the effect of the explanatory variables somewhat, although the coeffi-
cient for economic growth now turns statistically insignificant. All the controls have the 
expected signs (remembering that positive values for Previous election indicate net 
vote-losses for the dictator), but only Government consumption – my proxy for patron-
age – and Previous election – my proxy for the dictator’s perceived electoral vulnerabil-
ity – appear to stand in a systematic relationship to the margins of victory. Neither of 
these two controls is highly influential, though, with a change of one unit producing an 
increase or decrease in the autocrat’s margin of roughly half a percentage point when 
holding other factors constant. In the form of a more practical example, expanding the 
consumption of the public sector from 10% of GDP per capita in the 1970s to 25% by 
the 2000s is predicted to have brought about an increase of approximately 8.8 percent-
age points in the margins of victory in Burkina Faso. 
Apart from fraud and media control, then, the findings once again correspond in a 
high degree to the theoretical expectations derived from Magaloni’s theory. As concerns 
these two exceptions, the fact that Fraud is found to be a poor predictor of the degree of 
competitiveness is not entirely surprising, since this may be taken as a sign of electoral 
malpractices being generally redundant for maintaining the autocrat’s electoral domi-
nance. Alternatively, the indicator used to measure this factor may be too crude to cap-
ture the finer nuances of this highly multifaceted and covert phenomenon. This may 
also account for the fact that media restrictions display no effect significantly different 
from zero, which is otherwise a more perplexing finding seeing how this factor plays 
such a central role in Magaloni’s argument. 
Unfortunately, the results from this particular model are open to some debate as they 
could well be influenced by the rather stark drop in the number of observations if com-
pared to the baseline models. Indeed, this appears on closer inspection to account in part 
for the fact that both economic growth and fraud emerge as statistically insignificant. 
Indeed, when dropping the variable Previous election, which suffers from a high num-
ber of missing observations, and thereby gaining an N of 279, economic growth once 
again emerges as significant at the .90 level (β = 0.77, SE = 0.42), whereas fraud now 
becomes highly significant at the .99 level (β = 10.22, SE = 3.36), meaning that the dic-
tator can expect to inflate his vote share with no less than 10 percentage points when 
compared to holding clean elections, ceteris paribus. While the results for the other in-
dependent and control variables remain essentially the same (results not shown), this 
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indicates that we cannot exclude the possibility of fraud making a significant contribu-
tion to the maintenance of a low degree of competitiveness. 
Model 4 – the opposition model – in turn evaluates the impact of the explanatory 
variables when holding the effects of the opposition’s actions constant. As Table 5.1 
reveals, the independent variables continue to be statistically significant even after this 
battery of control variables is included, with the interaction variables, urbanisation and 
repression once again constituting the exception. All these variables apart from Ethnic 
groups and Repression also display the predicted signs. 
Of the controls, only boycotts have a noticeable effect on competitiveness. Not sur-
prisingly, this effect qualifies as quite a substantial one – all else being equal, even a 
partial opposition boycott is predicted to raise the dictator’s margin by some 16.3 per-
centage points in comparison to situations where the opposition decides to participate 
fully. The short-term consequences of “boo[ing] from the fences” (Schedler 2006, 14) 
are in other words dramatic and highly negative from the opposition’s point of view, 
although one must bear in mind that this alone tells us little about the long-term effects 
of this tactic. The fragmentation of the opposition is, on the other hand, found to be non-
significant, albeit with the “correct” sign. Because the indicator proxies the co-
ordination dilemmas faced by the opposition parties by using their respective vote 
shares in the previous election, this may well be a function of the fact that the measure 
is incapable of tracking changes in intra-opposition relations – such as the creation of 
united opposition fronts – that take place in the time which falls in-between the two 
elections. Finally, the effect of opposition protests also falls short of statistical signifi-
cance, perhaps reflecting the fact that this tactic can come to work in either direction. 
Model 5 takes into account the influence of regime external factors and reveals a 
very similar picture as the earlier specifications, with the effect of voter heterogeneity as 
discovered in the baseline models remaining constant in form and significance. As both 
control variables turn out to be insignificant, it can be concluded that variation in the 
margins of victory cannot be explained by dependency on either development aid or 
foreign direct investment. This finding should, however, once again not cause us to 
jump to conclusions. It is, after all, conceivable that external factors may well have an 
effect on the margins of victory, but as it is far from easy to establish the exact causal 
mechanism through which they operate and create appropriate indicators with which to 
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test this relationship, the chosen indicators may simply be inappropriate for tracing 
these effects.
47
 
Given the emergence of such a clear and consistent pattern, Model 6 builds upon the 
earlier specifications by including all independent variables alongside those control 
variables that were found to be approaching levels of statistical significance. This fully 
specified model not only has a much improved explanatory power (R
2
 = .36) – the par-
allel model including the interaction variables and urbanisation is able to account for an 
even higher proportion of the overall variation in the margins of victory (R
2
 = .41) – but 
also delivers further evidence to support the robustness of the argument advanced in this 
thesis as the obtained results mirror those of the baseline models almost exactly. Be-
sides the four “usual suspects” among the independent variables, also government con-
sumption, the dictator’s electoral vulnerability as well as boycotts retain their signifi-
cance alongside the outlier dummy variable Singapore and Malaysia. 
Of greatest interest in this model is, however, the fact that the coefficient for fraud 
now turns significant at the .90 level, signifying that electoral malpractices can be ex-
pected to enhance the autocrat’s vote share, ceteris paribus, by roughly 6 percentage 
points. Whether this is due to the existence of some complex and hitherto un-modelled 
relationship between the different strategies being controlled for in this model, or 
whether it is simply an artefact of the reduced number of observations as discussed ear-
lier remains an open question, though. 
Finally, Models 7 and 8 disaggregate the results from the fully specified model ac-
cording to the type of election in order to investigate whether any systematic differences 
exist between parliamentary and presidential elections. The severely diminished number 
of observations again constitutes a serious predicament for statistical inference, and the 
results from these subsamples must therefore be considered far from decisive. Keeping 
this caveat in mind, it can nonetheless be observed that the results from Model 7, which 
covers legislative elections, mimic those from the composite model almost exactly with 
regard to both the independent variables and the controls – of the latter, only opposition 
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 There is indeed some evidence that this might be the case. If a regime’s ties to geographically proxi-
mate democratic polities (typically operationalised in the literature as the proportion of democracies in a 
given regime’s region in percentages) are included as an alternative measure, external factors turn out to 
have a highly significant and negative effect (β = -0.34, SE = 0.11, p < .001) on the margins of victory in 
this model. However, seeing that the literature fails to specify the actual factors that serve to bridle the 
dictator’s willingness to resort to electoral malpractices and violence, hence bringing about the observed 
correlation, I am reluctant to use the variable in the actual analysis. 
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boycotts emerge as having no significant effect on the degree of competitiveness – and 
on average even grow in strength, with especially fraud now having a strong positive 
impact. 
Model 8, which in turn focuses on presidential elections, paints a more complex pic-
ture. Of the independent variables, ln(GDP) is found to have no significant effect on the 
margin of victory, whereas the significance and strength of the others remain roughly 
the same. Since neither Singapore nor Malaysia organise competitive presidential elec-
tions within the chosen time-frame, this variable is omitted from the regression. The 
control variables are subject to changes, too, as neither government consumption nor 
fraud now appear to be systematically related to the degree of competitiveness. At the 
same time, the president’s electoral track-record remains a good indicator of the margin 
of victory, as do opposition boycotts, which are expected to inflate the president’s vote 
share by a whopping 23.5 percentage points, ceteris paribus. 
These results, which in light of the low number of cases (N = 175 and N = 96, re-
spectively) must be considered tentative at best, seem, on the one hand, to indicate that 
the strategies employed by the dictator and the opposition might in fact vary according 
to the type of election. As far as the dictator’s strategic toolkit goes, the finding that co-
optation, fraud and repression are not systematically related to the president’s vote share 
must be considered somewhat perplexing, but it might indicate that this type of elec-
tions call for more targeted measures, which my indicators fail to account for. It is per-
fectly conceivable, for example, that the limited number of contestants running in a 
presidential race when compared to nation-wide legislative elections with hundreds or 
thousands of candidates, renders subjecting the opposition candidates to such highly 
targeted measures as house-arrests, feigned court-cases, wilful incarcerations and forced 
exiles more (cost-)effective than trying to suppress competitiveness with large-scale 
ballot rigging or vote buying (see also Schedler 2009b). 
Boycotts appear in turn to be an essential tool for the opposition in presidential elec-
tions, but carry less weight in legislative battles – a finding that may warrant a substan-
tive interpretation. For one, the president is typically the ruling head of state, and presi-
dential races therefore tend to involve much higher stakes than legislative elections. As 
the presidential office is at the same time undividable, it is also more difficult to co-opt 
and divide the opposition in presidential elections than in legislative races, where multi-
ple seats are up for grabs. On the basis of this, it may hypothesised that the winner-
takes-it-all-logic underlying presidential elections yields more comprehensive and 
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forceful opposition boycotts than legislative elections where free-riding is likely to wa-
ter down the effect of the measure. 
On the other hand and more importantly for the current investigation, voter behav-
iour as a mirror of the electorate’s socio-demographic heterogeneity does not, with the 
sole exception of increasing wealth, reveal any systematic changes when moving from 
one type of election to the other. Thus, voters and voter heterogeneity appear to matter 
for the outcome of both presidential and legislative elections under electoral authoritar-
ian rule. 
In conclusion, the analysis delivers strong evidence in support of the research ques-
tion under exploration in this thesis. By virtue of the diverging voting behaviours it gen-
erates, the socio-demographic composition of the electorate indeed constitutes one of 
the major determinants of competitiveness in electoral authoritarian regimes, even when 
controlling for numerous alternative explanations. It may, by means of logical exten-
sion, further be expected to function as an important indicator of the political stability of 
this particular regime type, even though this topic lies beyond the scope of the current 
investigation. 
At the same time, the analysis provides less than straight-forward support for the six 
hypotheses seeking to parse the individual components of this heterogeneity and their 
respective effects on the dependent variable in line with Magaloni’s (2008) theory. The 
factors that were found to be good indicators of the degree of electoral competitiveness 
include ethnicity, the level of societal development and long-term economic growth, 
even though ethnicity failed to behave in accordance with the original theoretical expec-
tations and the effect of GDP per capita appears to be contingent upon controlling for 
outliers. The hypotheses proposing that the ruling party’s political standpoints relative 
to those of the electorate, increasing urbanisation and the use of repression have an im-
pact on the margins of victory clearly did not live up to scrutiny. In this light, we may 
conclude that only certain types of heterogeneity seem to breed identities that are politi-
cally salient and, consequently, spill over to voting behaviour. This also holds true of 
the factors that might cancel out the effects of heterogeneity, as only economic growth 
was found to be significant. 
Additional findings of interest pertain to the roles of the ruling dictator and the oppo-
sition parties. All in all, the analysis finds evidence to support the claim advanced by 
earlier studies of how competitive non-democratic elections tend to be affairs stage-
managed by the dictator. Accordingly, only boycotts appear to make a difference to the 
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margins of victory as far as the tactics of the opposition parties are concerned, and even 
they tend to benefit the dictator, at least in the short run. At the same time, the impor-
tance of the dictator having access to politicised resources, possessing a convincing 
electoral track-record and being dexterous in tampering with vote ballots appears to be 
vindicated, although fraud is not consistently significant, at the same time as a media 
bias in the incumbent autocrat’s favour is found to be non-significant. Finally, the evi-
dence does not suggest that external factors belong among the most important determi-
nants of competitiveness, although it must be recognised that this finding may be an 
artefact of the chosen variables. 
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6. Conclusion 
In the wake of the third wave of democratisation, electoral autocracies have risen to 
become the modal type of non-democratic rule in the world. Characterised by an uneasy 
combination of real but unfair electoral competition for political power, these systems 
are prone to engender conflicting political dynamics, whose consequences for the con-
tinuation of autocratic rule as well as for the prospects of democratisation have been the 
subject of intense theorisation and empirical research in recent years. 
In this electoral game, the degree of competitiveness as a mirror of the underlying 
balance of power between the ruling autocrat and the opposition has been recognised to 
play a pivotal role in shaping the electoral outcome and determining the stability of the 
regime. At the same time, however, investigations into the determinants of competitive-
ness in non-democratic elections have remained relatively scarce and limited in scope. 
Especially the role of the voters has long been all but ignored here as scholars have con-
tinued to entertain simplistic and unrealistic notions about a homogeneous and essen-
tially passive electorate, while focusing their efforts predominantly on the actions of the 
other players. The very real possibility of the electorate as a collective of heterogeneous 
actors with heterogeneous preferences making an active contribution to the maintenance 
and dismantling of electoral equilibria has hence remained a virtually unexplored topic 
in the literature on electoral authoritarian regimes. 
In seeking an answer to this – in my view – pivotal question of whether voter hetero-
geneity stands in a systematic relationship to the degree of competitiveness, Beatriz 
Magaloni’s (2008) theory of voter behaviour offered an auspicious starting point. By 
modelling competitive authoritarian elections as a decision-theoretic game taking place 
within the idiosyncratic institutional constraints of electoral authoritarian rule, Magaloni 
explicitly demonstrates how different forms of voter heterogeneity spill over to voting 
behaviour that either strengthens or weakens the dictator’s electoral dominance. By 
concurrently illustrating the behaviour of the other actors, the theory also enables a 
theoretically more comprehensive analysis of the political dynamics of electoral authori-
tarian regimes than rivalling theories. 
From this theoretical baseline, I moved on to model the hypothesised relationship 
under investigation. In the operationalisation and the creation of the models, an effort 
was made to take into account alternative explanations that might explain the observed 
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level of competitiveness, but attention was also paid to making methodological im-
provements by employing more appropriate datasets and more rigorous methods. 
I then proceeded to the actual analysis, which tested the existence of the suggested 
relationship between voter heterogeneity and competitiveness by employing a random 
effects regression analysis encompassing the universe of competitive authoritarian elec-
tions from 1974 to 2006. The overall results of this analysis confirmed the existence of 
such a systematic link, even though this relationship emerged as being contingent upon 
the form of voter heterogeneity, seeing how the analysis in fact offered mixed support 
for the six research hypotheses, as well as for the controlling variables. 
In the light of my analysis, the following picture emerges of the electoral dynamics 
in competitive authoritarian elections. When casting their ballots, voters in electoral 
autocracies appear to be motivated primarily by economic concerns rather than ideology 
or the fear of violent repercussions from the side of the dictator. Furthermore, their 
choices do not seem to vary according to their place of residence. Because the voters 
will thus support the dictator as long as they depend upon him for their livelihood, in-
creasing wealth and socio-economic heterogeneity are predicted to erode the autocrat’s 
electoral margins by enabling the voters to make “ideological investments”. Even richer 
voters benefit from a booming economy, however, and are under such circumstances 
expected to relinquish their plans to vote for the opposition. The voters will also support 
the dictator on the grounds of a common ethnic affiliation, perhaps because they share 
some deep ontological feeling of community or because kinship is tied to the distribu-
tion of patronage. 
Voter heterogeneity seems in other words to translate into vote choices and competi-
tiveness primarily through the voters’ ethnic affiliations and their level of income. 
These results of are mostly consistent with the findings of earlier studies (Greene 2010; 
Schedler 2009b; but see Roessler and Howard 2008), although the outcome for ethnicity 
appears somewhat ambiguous in my analysis, as also growing ethnic heterogeneity was 
found to increase the dictator’s margin of victory; on closer inspection, this discrepancy 
is probably a consequence of spurious correlation between the number of ethnic groups 
and the degree of competitiveness. 
Exploiting the voters’ behaviour, the dictator in turn seeks to boost his vote share by 
resorting to patronage networks built on politicised resources and by erecting an im-
pression of electoral invulnerability, which is to deter voters from defecting to the oppo-
sition. The dictator may also – when all else fails – take to fraud to maintain his hold on 
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power. Within the parameters of the electoral game, the opposition is not left with many 
options of action and only boycotts were found to have a (strongly negative) impact on 
the degree of competitiveness. 
These findings are perfectly in line with Magaloni’s theory and mostly in line with 
the findings of other contributions (Greene 2010; Schedler 2009b). So, too, is the result 
of external factors being redundant for the degree of competitiveness (Roessler and 
Howard 2008). On the other hand, the fact that the analysis provided no support for the 
claim that media restrictions, opposition protests or the unity of the opposition have an 
impact on the degree of competitiveness contradicts the findings of Roessler and How-
ard (2008), Schedler (2009b) and Greene (2010), alongside Magaloni’s own argument. 
On the basis of its contradictious findings, but also of its more general strengths and 
weakness, the analysis can be thought of as having four broader implications for the 
current and future study of competitiveness in electoral autocracies. Starting off on a 
methodological note, it reveals first of all a need for greater conceptual, theoretical and 
methodological integration in the field. Indeed, the fact that my results in many in-
stances contradict earlier contributions – including, to a lesser extent, Magaloni’s theory 
– confirms a point reverberated throughout this thesis, namely, that our understanding 
of what causes the degree of competitiveness to vary remains piecemeal and is blurred 
by an inconsistent empirical picture. 
Of course, it is not impossible that the observed incongruities mirror real substantive 
differences between countries or regime subtypes. It is, for instance, not difficult to hy-
pothesise that presidential and legislative systems may display slightly diverging dy-
namics, provided that the findings from Models 7 and 8 in the previous chapter are rep-
resentative of their respective subsamples. However, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that these discrepancies in fact only reflect differences in the methodological, theoretical 
and conceptual choices made by the respective scholars, such as how the universe of 
cases has been defined or how the dependent variable has been operationalised. While 
such pluralism is not intrinsically harmful, in the absence of “common land” to stand 
upon it renders comparisons between these studies in the interest of making broader 
inferences and generalisations exceedingly tricky owing to the fact that the studies cover 
such a colourful mixture of different countries, years and mechanisms. 
At the same time, my analysis indicates that this type of integration is not impossible 
to achieve. If we briefly turn to evaluate the generalisability of Magaloni’s argument, it 
is clear that some of the results of my analysis run contrary to the expectations derived 
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from her theory, especially as regards the opposition. Whether this is due to the limited 
explanatory power of the argument itself, or to my conceptualisation and operationalisa-
tion of the relevant variables, cannot be determined in the light of the current investiga-
tion. Concurrently, the overall results seem to testify to the solid explanatory power of 
Magaloni’s core argument, i.e. the role played by the voters, with the insignificance of 
urbanisation emerging in this vein as the sole true abnormality to evade a plausible ex-
planation in the global inquiry. While Magaloni’s theory hence cannot be elevated to the 
status of a general theory of competitiveness under autocracy, her efforts could serve as 
an example to newer contributions seeking to create a more ambitious framework for 
analysing electoral competition. 
Secondly, the analysis bears witness to the fact that obtaining reliable data and de-
veloping appropriate indicators with which to investigate many of the factors that are 
central to the study of electoral authoritarian regimes continues to be Sisyphean labour. 
Even though the current investigation warrants the merit of seeking to expand the theo-
retical scope of the analysis in order to produce more valid generalisations, this effort is 
probably undermined by it having to settle for proxy indicators and other “second-best” 
alternatives when choosing its variables. While my study is far from alone in this, the 
consequences of this practice for the validity of the results must be considered negative. 
Thirdly and on a more substantive note, my analysis also shows that the power in-
vested in citizens by dictators when instituting competitive elections ought – contrary to 
the general view held in the literature on electoral authoritarianism – to be taken seri-
ously. In doing so, my thesis both demonstrates and underscores the need to broaden 
and systematise our view of electoral competitiveness so as to also include the elector-
ate (and structural factors) amongst its determinants. At the same time, however, the 
current analysis surely cannot be considered more than a tentative first step in the direc-
tion of exploring this vast lacuna. 
The fact of the matter is that Magaloni’s theory – in its current formulation, anyway 
– would hardly allow for a more elaborate investigation into all the potentially signifi-
cant forms of voter heterogeneity. But despite Magaloni’s theory doing a decent job at 
modelling voter behaviour within its current parameters, this by no means indicates that 
further theories could not, or should not, be developed to investigate the workings of 
hitherto ignored forms of voter heterogeneity. Indeed, complementing our understand-
ing of the various political identities that guide voter behaviour with an exploration of 
additional and previously unexplored ones, while refining our knowledge of how eth-
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nicity and increasing wealth come to operate, seems in the light of the current investiga-
tion to be a recommendable next step in the study of electoral autocracies. 
Fourthly and finally, the analysis points to the need of adopting a more comprehen-
sive analytical approach when examining the role played by voters in electoral autocra-
cies. This plea pertains above all to questions of whether the observed relationship be-
tween voter heterogeneity and electoral competitiveness may be expected to naturally 
extend itself to one between voter heterogeneity and democratisation, and what the form 
of this relationship in that case would be. Could heightened competitiveness as a result 
of increasing socio-economic heterogeneity be a conducive combination for establishing 
a stable democratic polity, as postulated by Dahl (1971)? Or perhaps a high degree of 
competitiveness that builds upon ethnic heterogeneity is likely to yield a spiral of vio-
lence rather than set the country on the path to popular rule (Mousseau 2001)? 
While such questions unfortunately lie beyond the scope of this thesis, they will be-
fore long become indispensable for the study of electoral authoritarianism at large. After 
all, it is precisely this issue of who wins on Election Day that renders electoral competi-
tiveness important for scholars, democracy promoters and the participating actors alike. 
And it is precisely here that the diverging choices and actions of heterogeneous voters 
step into the analytical limelight. As Magaloni (2008, 19) points out, vote choices are 
under electoral authoritarian rule often constrained by complex strategic dilemmas that 
impede the voters from simply ousting the incumbent autocrat – this being the “tragic 
brilliance” of such systems. Although beggars cannot be choosers, the possibility of 
“throwing the rascals out” does emerge once broader socio-demographic changes enable 
increasing numbers of voters to break loose from these shackles and to exercise the 
rights bestowed upon them by the principle of competitive elections. And once this pos-
sibility exists, every now and then the voters indeed choose to throw the rascals out. 
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Appendix 1: Description of variables and data sources
Variable Indicator Source 
Margin of vic-
tory 
In presidential elections the difference in vote 
shares between the winner and the runner-up as a 
percentage of total valid votes in the first round; 
In legislative elections the difference in seat shares 
between the largest and the second largest party as 
a percentage 
Nohlen et al. (2005a, 
2005b; 2001a, 2001b; 
2000; 2010) 
IFES (2011) 
African Elections Da-
tabase (2011) 
   
Government 
identity 
Measure of the ruling party’s ideological orienta-
tion with three categories: right, centre and left 
DPI (Beck et al. 2001) 
Day and Degenhardt 
(Various years) 
   
Ethnic first The size of the largest ethnic group as a percentage 
of the total population 
Ellingsen (2000) 
   
Ethnic groups The number of ethnic groups that constitute 5 per 
cent or more of the total population 
Ellingsen (2000) 
   
ln(GDP) Natural log of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita 
(Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices 
Penn World Tables 7 
(Heston, Summers, 
and Aten 2011) 
   
Economic 
growth 
Average change in GDP in percentages between 
elections or during five years before the election at 
hand if no previous election 
World Development 
Indicators (World 
Bank 2011) 
   
Urban popula-
tion 
Urban population as a percentage of total popula-
tion 
World Development 
Indicators (World 
Bank 2011) 
   
Repression The Freedom House Civil Liberties scale (1-7) 
lagged by one year 
Freedom House (2011) 
   
Singapore and 
Malaysia 
Dichotomous variable coded 1 when election was 
held in Singapore or Malaysia, otherwise 0 
NELDA (Hyde and 
Marinov 2010) 
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Government 
consumption 
Annual general government final consumption 
including expenditures for purchases, services and 
wages as a percentage of GDP 
World Development 
Indicators (World 
Bank 2011) 
   
Fraud Dichotomous variable coded 1 if electoral fraud is 
reported, otherwise 0 
NELDA (Hyde and 
Marinov 2010) 
   
Media bias Dichotomous variable coded 1 if reported allega-
tions of the media being biased in favour of the 
incumbent are made, otherwise 0 
NELDA (Hyde and 
Marinov 2010) 
   
Previous elec-
tion 
Change in the incumbent’s vote share in percent-
ages since the previous election. 
Nohlen et al. (2005a, 
2005b; 2001a, 2001b; 
2000; 2010) 
IFES (2011) 
African Elections Da-
tabase (2011) 
   
Boycott Dichotomous variable coded 1 if at least some of 
the opposition parties boycotted the election, oth-
erwise 0 
NELDA (Hyde and 
Marinov 2010) 
   
Protest Dichotomous variable coded 1 if at least some of 
the opposition parties protested the outcome of the 
election, otherwise 0, and lagged by one election 
cycle 
NELDA (Hyde and 
Marinov 2010) 
   
Opposition 
fragmentation 
Fractionalisation of the opposition measured by 
dividing the seat (L)/vote (P) share of the first op-
position party by the sum of the total seat/vote 
share of all opposition parties 
Nohlen et al. (2005a, 
2005b; 2001a, 2001b; 
2000; 2010) 
IFES (2011) 
African Elections Da-
tabase (2011) 
IPU (Various years) 
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Aid Average percentage change in net ODA received as 
a percentage of GNI in the two years preceding the 
election at hand 
World Development 
Indicators (World 
Bank 2011) 
   
Foreign direct 
investment 
Average net inflow of foreign direct investment as 
a percentage of GDP in the two years preceding the 
election at hand 
World Development 
Indicators (World 
Bank 2011) 
 
